

THE SEXES COMPARED

AND OTHER ESSAYS



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
BY

EDWARD VON HARTMANN.

AUTHOR OF "THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS," ETC.

SELECTED AND TRANSLATED

A. KENNER, M.A.



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LONDON
SWAN SONNENSCHN & CO.
NEW YORK: MACMILLAN & CO.

1895

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
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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

HARTMANN'S writings have met with a remarkable reception in Germany. His "Philosophy of the Unconscious" ran through seven editions in an incredibly short time, and has now reached a tenth edition. His doctrines have been vigorously attacked, and as vigorously defended, by himself as well as by others. Several of the most prominent philosophers of the day have thrown themselves enthusiastically into the conflict. It is stated in the preface to the seventh edition of "The Philosophy of the Unconscious," that between the years 1870-75, no fewer than 58 works appeared on Hartmann's system. O. Pluma-cher, in her "Strife concerning the Unconscious," (1880) enumerates about 300. Max Schneidewin, writing in 1892, estimates the number at over 1000. Rarely, if ever, has any writer produced such a profound commotion in scientific and philosophic circles.

English readers have already had an opportunity of becoming acquainted with our author's doctrines, Mr. W. C. Coupland having translated the "Philosophy of the Unconscious" in 1884. This is the first time, however, that an attempt has been made to render Hartmann's more popular essays into English. "My Relation to Schopenhauer" is taken from "The Philosophical Questions of the Present Day;" "The Comforts of Pessimism" from the "Collected Studies and Essays," and the others from "Modern Problems."

Karl Robert Edward von Hartmann was born on 23rd of February, 1842, at 112 Linenstrasse, Berlin. He was an only child, and was thus in early life limited to the companionship of elderly people. This fact probably contributed somewhat to the astounding precociousness which characterized his mental development. In 1848 he entered the Königliche Seminarschule, and in 1852 the Friedrichs-Werdersche Gymnasium. During his school days he filled up his leisure time—of which he had plenty, owing to the lack of companions—with painting and music and assiduous reading. In this connection it is gratifying to note that he preferred English novels to those of France and his own country. His favourite authors were Scott, Lytton, Dickens and Marryat.

He obtained his certificate before he was 17, and, having determined not to adopt a University career, he set about choosing a profession for himself. He was guided in this matter by the desire for an active employment which should yet leave him sufficient leisure to pursue his scientific and philosophic studies. He eventually decided on the military profession, notwithstanding the remonstrances of his parents; rightly thinking that this calling would also enable him to obtain that general experience of men and manners so absolutely necessary to a scientific study of human nature. He accordingly entered the Artillery and Engineering School in 1859, and stayed three years. Aided by his father, who was of high standing in the army, he obtained a commission in 1860. At this time Schopenhauer formed a fruitful topic of discussion among the more cultured military men. This fact has been thought by some people a significant element in Hartmann's philosophic education. Hartmann, however, denies being influenced in any way by the conversation of his fellow-officers. On the contrary, he speaks very disparagingly of their literary taste and education, and isolated him-

self from them in hermetical seclusion. He was not destined to remain a soldier long. In 1861 he met with an accident, which ultimately developed into a serious knee trouble, and caused his retirement from the army four years later.

Hartmann now devoted himself entirely to Philosophy. He had already written a number of essays of psychological and metaphysical interest, and commenced his "Philosophy of the Unconscious." This he finished in 1867, and in the same year obtained his doctorate. It is not a fact, as Erdmann seems to think, that he at any time occupied the position of a privatdocent. He made no attempt to gain a University appointment, and when, between 1869-71, he received invitations from Leipzig, Göttingen, and Marburg to become a full professor, he refused them all.

In 1871, he married Agnes Taubert, a daughter of an old military friend of his father. In the battle which raged round Hartmann's system, she occupied a prominent position on the side of her husband. In 1873 she produced "Pessimism and its Opponents," which is chiefly noteworthy for its praiseworthy and successful effort to divert the discussion on pessimism from sentimental into scientific channels.

Hartmann's life was now doubly overclouded by death. His father died in 1876, and his wife, after an extremely painful illness, sank into an early grave. Nevertheless, he struggled manfully against these overwhelming misfortunes, and devoted himself more assiduously to his work, completing "The Phenomenology of the Moral Consciousness" within a year of his wife's death.

In 1878 he married Alma Lorrenz, but their happiness was short-lived. Hartmann's knee began to trouble him again, and his wife lay sick for seven months. To add to his misfortunes, he met with another accident in the autumn of 1881, which

brought on inflammation of his sound knee. In 1883 he underwent three severe operations, and, although the last was successful, he never fully recovered from their effects. He was certainly competent, from the point of view of personal experience, to write about "the importance of pain."

Berlin had now grown into a prosperous and well-populated town, too noisy, in fact, for our studious and retiring philosopher. He accordingly, in 1885, shifted his home from the busy city into the quiet suburb of Gross-Lichterfelde. In this pleasantly-situated spot he has lived ever since, spending the morning in work, and the afternoon in giving musical instruction to his children, and in helping them with their home lessons; in the evening he is frequently visited by his Berlin friends.

Nothing is known in England of Hartmann, except that he is the author of "The Philosophy of the Unconscious," and even this work seems only to have been read in the first two editions. Sidgwick, for instance, in his "History of Ethics," devotes one or two pages to "The Philosophy of the Unconscious," without having the least suspicion that Hartmann had also written a monumental work on Ethics, namely, "The Phenomenology of the Moral Consciousness." It will not, therefore, be superfluous for me to give a concise account of our author's writings.

His literary activity may be divided into five periods. The first extends from 1857-1864, and includes a number of philosophical monographs, undertaken solely for the author's own education. The second, from 1864-1867, was occupied in the development of "The Philosophy of the Unconscious." The third, from 1867-1877, comprises a number of essays, articles, and books, written in defence of his own system. This period ends with the appearance, in 1867, of "The Unconscious, from the Standpoint of Physiology and Evolution." The fourth, 1877-1882,

was taken up with practical philosophy, *i.e.*, Ethics and the Theory of Religion. To this period belongs the completion of "The Phenomenology of the Moral Consciousness," and the production of "The Religion of the Spirit." The fifth, from 1882-1887, is the period of æsthetic philosophy, the most noteworthy publication being "The Philosophy of the Beautiful."

The following have appeared since 1890 :—

"The Spirit Hypothesis of Spiritualism and its Phantoms," the second edition of "The History and Basis of Pessimism," "Kant's Theory of Knowledge and Metaphysics," and "Social Questions."

I gladly avail myself of this opportunity of tendering my deepest gratitude to Dr. Hartmann for his kindness in furnishing me with valuable information concerning his life and writings. I am also largely indebted to the excellent autobiography with which he introduces his "Collected Studies and Essays," and to the supplementary article which appeared in Vol. VI. of the "Gesellschaft" (1887). My best thanks are due to Mr. S. Gelberg, B.A., and Mr. E. J. Wyler, who have materially assisted me in preparing these essays for the press.

In the introduction to the tenth edition of the "Philosophy of the Unconscious," Hartmann gives an exhaustive list of the philosophers who have influenced him in the development of his system. The most important are Spinoza, Schelling, Schopenhauer, and Hegel. The traces of Jewish mysticism found in his writings are no doubt due to the first-named, who, in early life, had drunk freely from the fountains of Jewish philosophy. Like these thinkers, Hartmann is a pantheist. His system is a mediation between the Absolute Will of Schopenhauer and the Absolute Idea of Hegel. His relations with both these philosophers have been strangely misunderstood. While the influence of Schopenhauer has

been vastly exaggerated, that of Hegel has been equally under-estimated. Hartmann consequently found it necessary to write two essays—one on Schopenhauer and the other on Hegel—for the purpose of clearing up this confusion. The one on Schopenhauer appears in this volume. He rejects Schopenhauer's Subjective Idealism in Theory of Knowledge, his Abstract Monism in Metaphysics, and his Abstract Idealism in *Æsthetics*. He differs from him, too, in method. Schopenhauer's system is deductive—Hartmann's inductive. It is in actual experience that we find phenomena of unconscious will and unconscious intellect. Hence Hartmann rose to the universal conception of the "Unconscious," which combines both will and intellect. But, above all, they are diametrically opposed in the domain of Ethics, although they both base their theory of Conduct on Pessimism. According to Schopenhauer, the sole moral exercise for the individual is to suppress the will to live, and to save himself from a world where pain overwhelmingly preponderates over pleasure. Hartmann, though he entertains similar views of the relation between pleasure and pain, yet exhorts the individual to actively engage in unselfish acts, and to devote himself to the service of the whole. His Ethics are really based on Pessimism, combined with Monism and Optimism. The first ruthlessly exposes the utter worthlessness of all selfish pleasures, and thus leaves the road clear for altruistic action. Monism teaches the oneness of all individuals who are linked together as parts of the World-Being. It therefore induces human beings to actively work for the benefit of the whole. Lastly, there is the Optimistic element which comforts us with the hope that the world is being providentially guided to the utter painlessness and joylessness of Nirvana (non-existence). It is not by any means a comfortless doctrine. It dispels illusions and awakens our minds

to the truth. We, who are compelled to spend our lives in a world, which, although the best of all possible worlds, is still bad, are sadly in need of consolation. This is offered us by the prospect of an absolutely painless state.

All human relations are of course explained on a mystic basis. Sexual love, for instance, is merely a sign of the yearning towards universal union of which every human soul has a vaguely fascinating presentiment. The real consummation of Love can therefore only take place when we have ceased to exist as individuals, and have become absorbed in the World Spirit.

Some account of our author's pessimism will be found in "The Comforts of Pessimism."

The New Woman will find little to encourage her in the essays on the sexes and the family. The predominant note struck is the impossibility of exact equality between the sexes. A fundamental physiological distinction separates them by an impassable gulf. Man is by nature active—woman passive. This difference has a profound effect on the occupation of both parties. It also emphasises the utter fallaciousness of the cry for an equal standard of morality. Woman's central task is to rear and educate a family. For this function she is obviously fitted by Nature. Any attempt to strike out for herself in an independent employment, only serves to render her unfit for her natural vocation. It is deplorable, then, that young girls do not prepare themselves more adequately for their future calling as wives and mothers.

Hartmann attempts to solve the problem of the decline of the family among the more cultured classes. This evil is mainly attributable to the late marital age of men and women, which, to a large extent, is caused by the universally prevailing desire to live above one's position. Some effect might be achieved

by placing a tax on bachelors, and by reforming the law of intestacy to secure a larger share of the estate to the married heirs. Such an action on the part of the legislature, in addition to its intrinsic value, may rouse the unmarried to a sense of the duty they owe to the State and Society—of founding and rearing a family of healthy and well-trained children.

"Our Relation to Animals" is a powerful and trenchant attack on the opponents of vivisection. It is most emphatically laid down that we must base our conduct to animals on justice, and not on sympathy. It is a mistake to think that animal torture is due to the deadening of the sympathetic sense. On the contrary, without a powerful capacity for feeling the pains of others, no pleasure would be derived from these barbarously depraved practices. Sympathy then is a false principle of conduct, and must be displaced by Justice.

Having established that our relation to animals must be founded on Justice—which recognises the superiority of the duty to humanity over that to animals—it is clear that, if necessary, living animals should be operated on, in the interests of human health and life. These operations are not by any means so dreadful as anti-vivisectionists would have us believe. Really very few vivisection experiments are attended with great pain; a good many are not even dangerous. It is the abuse, and not the use of vivisection that calls for the condemnation of every right-minded person. If vivisection were recognised by the State, there would be less chance of abuse. Its system would be thoroughly expounded in lectures, and students would thus learn how to conduct experiments with as little pain or danger to their subjects as possible.

In "The Need for Books," Hartmann rightly deplores the ever-growing tendency to substitute the

reading of ephemeral literature for literary and scientific works. Among other remedies for the cheapening of books, it is suggested that the Post Office should undertake their distribution. It is extremely doubtful, however, whether the intervention of the State in the publishing industry is likely to be attended with beneficial results.

"The Modern Lust for Fame" is devoted to a detailed account of the disadvantages of popularity. This essay is well worth reading, as its author was thoroughly competent to deal with this subject from his own personal experience. Still, it is greatly questionable, whether many persons will be induced by his remarks to cease toiling along the arduous road that ultimately leads to Fame.

A. K.

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THE SEXES COMPARED.

No one will agree with the eccentric opinion of a few physiologists, that the male and female organisms are merely appendages of their respective organs of propagation—indispensable accessories for the realisation of their functions. Yet there is a grain of truth in this extravagant view, completely overlooked by faddists clamoring for the equalisation of the sexes. The difference between the sexual characteristics of man and woman is of a most pronounced type.

This fundamental and irremovable distinction exercises a potent influence over the entire physical and spiritual life of mankind. It is a distinction of activity and passivity, of desiring and satisfying, of wooing and being wooed. It exists not only among the unmarried, but also among the married. A sexually passive man appears unmanly, and incapable of dis-

charging his natural functions. A sexually active woman is regarded as unwomanly, and as transcending her proper sphere. If both were active, then too much preponderance would be given to the sexual side of life. If both were passive, Nature's aim would not be sufficiently secured. It is owing, therefore, to the teleological design of Nature, that one sex is instinctively active and the other instinctively passive. The expediency of this arrangement is overlooked by those who reproach either of the sexes with their position in Nature, who strive to modify and remedy the social consequences and phenomena of this essential distinction. Should this attempt be crowned with greater success, it must inevitably result in either the effeminacy of man or the masculinity of woman, or in a certain degree in both; and it would not be long before its effects on the preservation of the population would become apparent.

If man wanted nothing, then woman would have nothing valuable to give him; in which case the influence of the gentler sex over the male would diminish to vanishing point. For this influence depends entirely on the fact, that woman is able to satisfy the desires of the

sterner sex, and that her sexual passivity makes it easier for her to refuse a man, than for him to curb his passions. This dominion is so great that, among all peoples, the male sex is subjected to the rule of the female, despite appearances to the contrary. The relationship which it establishes, usually survives the period of cohabitation, and impresses its seal on the whole of social life. As long as this mysterious power of the female—produced by the differences of the sexes—remains unimpaired, we must, by way of compensation, uphold the legal superiority of man, so that the balance may in some measure be readjusted. If we listened to the woman emancipationists, and deprived men of all their privileges in State and society, in law and morality, we should inaugurate a period of female rule unparalleled in history, and known only in legend. In this way the outcry for abstract equality defeats its own ends, since it altogether ignores the most important facts, which do not admit of legal treatment.

In the first place, it must be taken into consideration, that the sentiment which forms a part of female nature, and which is of peculiar value in the family and society, makes woman totally

unfit for public business, depending as it does on the undivided sway of the reason. Justice and Right would be far more unattainable than now, should woman ever engage in public life. On the contrary, nepotism and intrigue would flourish, and emphasis would be added to the irreconcilable opposition between the Conservative and Radical parties. Every woman would have command of two, and not of one vote only. The husband would, in fact, be compelled to sacrifice his political convictions for domestic peace and happiness. In all Catholic countries, the victory of the clerical party would be assured and established for some considerable time. The whole of the States, governed by ultramontane ministers (under Roman rule), would combine to form one power, which would be sufficient to ensure the gradual triumph of papacy over the whole earth. No one, then, would have a more forcible motive for effecting the political equality of the sexes than the ultramontanean, and yet for no one do the enthusiasts for emancipation work with more tireless energy than for the women of the Catholic Church.

Since the marital function, exercised by the

male at his leisure, and without any interference with his daily occupation, imposes the greatest inconvenience on the female, and is the essential element of her life, the organism of the woman is adapted to this object in a much greater degree than the man's. It finds in this function its centre of gravity, just as the central faculties of the man are those of the brain and the voluntary muscles. An amount of bodily or mental work which exercises no detrimental effect on the constitution of the man will soon destroy the female organism, or, at any rate, exhaust its energies. Hard manual labor consumes the feminine capacity for work much sooner than the masculine; it leads to premature old age and exhaustion; it weakens the power to resist the insidious influences of disease, and in this way considerably curtails life's duration. Immoderate mental work is even more harmful to woman, for the female brain and nervous system cannot bear nearly as much strain as the male. It is on this account that the education and training of both sexes must always remain different. At the utmost, woman can only engage in an occupation in which light mental work is combined with easy

physical labor, and which does not exact much muscular exertion. These employments, however (tailoring, gardening, shop-keeping, cooking, housekeeping, teaching and nursing), are much too restricted to make it possible for woman's work to receive the same pay as man's. Even in the instruction of small children women are so soon used up, that what is saved in salary goes to swell the pension fund, as women become superannuated much earlier than men. Generally speaking, women have to depend on the sterner sex for their living (especially among the more cultured classes of society), in return for which, they devote themselves to housekeeping, and the production and rearing of a family.

✓ In the domain of social morality, the demand for equality and equal judgment of the sexes is not less untenable than in politics and employment. The desire for emancipation must lead to one of these alternatives. Either we must permit a woman to do everything that is allowable to a man—in which case a reign of libertinage would be inaugurated utterly destructive of family life, and the welfare of the community, or we must look through prudish

spectacles and forbid man to indulge in any license denied to woman, in which case we should be led to an absurd and unnatural constraint, which would inevitably bring about either a reaction or a state of hypocritical Phariseism.

In only one point can we unconditionally admit the demand that man should be allowed no greater freedom than woman, and that is in the case of the monogamic marriage, whose existence requires the same faithfulness from both parties ; the same moral suppression of all incentives to unchastity. Even here the truth remains that the deviation from the strict path of marital virtue implies a higher degree of injustice on the part of the woman than of her husband, for the social consequences are different in both cases. Whilst the husband misconducts himself outside the family circle, the iniquity of the woman is bound to effect a change in the home. Adultery on the part of the husband does not necessarily alter the relations of the children to their parents and each other ; the unchastity of the wife, however, either altogether snaps the family bond or weakens it through doubt. The husband of a

notoriously unfaithful woman has to choose between acting the father to bastards, or, by divorce, making his own children motherless. If he cannot legally prove his wife's sin, he is not even left this choice, but is under the horrible compulsion of investing with the rights of children, offspring which he knows are not his own. Mere suspicion alone will poison family life, for it is always her own bed which the immoral wife besmirches. On the other hand, the husband's misconduct, since it takes place outside the sphere of the home, leaves the existence of the family and the position of the wife as mother and mistress of the hearth intact, even if a moral injury has been inflicted on the rights and feelings of the latter, and the welfare of the family has suffered material damage. The outraged wife may, if she be unrelenting, demand a divorce as her formal right, or she may forgive her husband, and ensure a home life for her young ones. A woman may pardon without any derogation of dignity ; not so the man. Woman alone, therefore, has the privilege of adorning herself with the divine quality of mercy, which, in similar circumstances, would make man look ridiculous.

The differences flowing from the fundamental distinction of the sexes are much more marked in the pre-nuptial state than in matrimony. A man indifferent to the sexual vagaries of his future wife (*vide* certain matrimonial advertisements) is to be despised. A woman, however, who, never doubting her lover's purity, is mortally offended on discovering traces of former amours, makes herself ridiculous (the heroine in Björnson's play, "The Glove"). If a man were sexually inactive he would be quite content to enter into a Platonic alliance with women; or, if he did marry at all, he would not be actuated by appropriate motives; but every sensitive woman objects strongly to such an union. If, then, a woman must wait for a sexually active man in order to be wooed for her own sake, she must be unreasonable to imagine that this activity remained latent until he knew her, and was first stirred into life at sight of her. On the other hand, every man has the right to expect that his *fiancée* should be a womanly, *i.e.*, a sexually passive woman, in other words, a virgin who had waited for the man of her choice to rouse her from a dreaming slumber to the full waking light of love. The

male lover finds his most entrancing delight in meeting with the unwritten page on which he may grave his own characters ; a pure passivity, a potentially requited love which he should be the first to transform into actuality. The virginity of the bride is therefore a *sine quâ non* of the marriage ceremony, and every deception on that point should, like adultery, form a legal ground for divorce. If, on the contrary, the chastity of the bridegroom were indispensable to matrimony, then, generally speaking, only such men would rear legitimate families whose physiological shortcomings would scarcely make their multiplication desirable. Moreover, a class of men would be gradually produced who would never give marriage a thought.

A maiden who is thinking of entrusting her life's happiness in the keeping of her lover would do well to examine every important circumstance which might help her in forming a just estimate of his character. In the first place, she should unquestionably inquire after his conduct with other women with whom he had been brought into intimate contact. She need not care for the fact itself that he had previously engaged in amours. The important

thing is to examine his behaviour on those occasions, and above all else the cause of separation. It is at least hazardous to marry a man who was the guilty party in a divorce suit, and the woman must not grumble at any evil consequences that may arise. Even in the absence of unchastity there are a number of dangerous qualities, such as indiscretion, selfishness, the pursuit of pleasure, want of reflection, snappishness, cruelty, ingratitude, frivolity, etc., which every sensible girl would be horrified to find in the character of the man to whom she is about to yield herself for life.

But this is quite different from the demand that the husband should have had no previous love-affairs, and must not be confused with it. If his conduct under these circumstances was irreproachable, then, as a lover tested by severe trials, his faithfulness would be much more assured than one who has not been subject to temptation. Even if it is doubtful whether a man can love two women equally well at the same time, it is certain, at least, that at different times he can love several with all his heart and soul. The statement, that there can be only one true love, is an unwarrantable ap-

plication to men of a proposition, true only in the field of feminine feeling.

The organism of the man is altogether unaffected by the transition from bachelorhood to the state of husband and father. He adds nothing to himself, and does not lose by what he gives. The woman, however, by this new relationship, does not give but receives, and in this way enters upon a new physiological plane of life, altering her whole constitution down to the veriest detail. Besides, a mother has to live for some time in an interchange of blood with a second body, whose composition is only half-conditioned by qualities inherited from the mother, the other half being contributed by paternally inherited characteristics. She has, therefore, partly nourished her system with blood, owing half its nature to her husband, and in this way has assimilated to a certain degree some of the peculiarities of the latter. These, indeed, lie dormant within her, but they can manifest themselves all the more strikingly in the children of a later marriage. (It has been incorrectly stated that these influences have a special effect in the sphere of propagation.) The husband of a widow does not

therefore find a clear page, but one written over by his predecessor, with whose hereditary tendencies his own must enter into conflict. A woman really gives herself up soul and body to her husband; a husband yields his soul, and yields his body only as he has undertaken the charge of working for his wife. The diversity of their instincts is very closely connected with this physiological difference of the action of marriage on both sexes. So long as the champions of the new woman cannot explain away this physiological difference, their attempts to weaken the distinction of the instincts would prove unavailing, and with a social equalisation which ignores both these differences, they would produce unnatural caricatures which could not last.

I certainly do not wish to be understood as raising an obstacle to the re-marriage of widows, although the frivolity with which this subject has been too copiously treated in comedies and romances is unworthy of the German people. A childless widow or a divorced woman, or such an one who cannot find her life's task in the education of her children, or does not feel herself capable of devoting all her energies to

this noble occupation, should in no way be prevented from seeking her life's work in a second marriage, especially if she has not in her first union exhausted all the rich stores of true love. Yet a mother would always do well to consider the training of her offspring as her most important function ; and, if she performs this task earnestly and faithfully, she will seldom have reason to look for a wider field of operation for her faculties. A man need not be prevented from marrying his beloved because she is a widow, but it must be clear to him that the widowhood is a point which he has ignored. The woman, for her part, must deserve this favor by extraordinary personal charms. A maiden, on the other hand, who enters into nuptial relations with a widower loses nothing by the bargain. She may, indeed, heartily congratulate herself on being united to a man already civilised and tamed by her predecessor.

Of a similar nature is the difference between a once-engaged man and woman. The former's value is in no way affected as long as the betrothal was broken off through no fault of his own. The latter, even if her conduct were

absolutely irreproachable, would be like an article of merchandise spoiled by shipwreck, and consequently fallen in price. However strictly she might have maintained her womanly passivity during her engagement, it is no longer latent. The virginity of her heart is no longer "intact." The fragrance has departed from the rose. Only once can woman practically learn what love is, and it is painful for the lover not to be the person to teach her. A tree injured by the frost of spring produces a second crop of foliage, yet it is not so rich and luxuriant as the first. In the same way, a maiden's heart may develop a second blossom, if the first has been prematurely withered and blown, but its full and complete magnificence is only possible when the love first roused within her runs its whole course undisturbed.

We must not understand this to mean that the dreams of still slumbering virginity, which give an ideal picture of the future life of love, should be discouraged, because these visions, in their utter lack of substance, do not encroach in any way on the rights of a future lover. Nor can we reproach the virgin with those involuntary and groping experiments with

which she endeavors to realise the ideal of her dreams in the actual men whose acquaintance she makes. Still more unreasonable is the view that the maiden should resolutely steel her heart against all wooers, until the man of her choice arrives, for he would never appear if all her experiments did not meet with a corresponding advance. It is only when by chance the attempt to find the ideal among her male friends proves successful that the dreams of the imagination are on the point of being transformed into a full palpitating life of love. But this wishing and longing, hoping and fearing, is still, in the first place, the ante-chamber to that real love which first bursts forth into life with the explicit or implicit understanding of both parties, *i.e.*, with the commencement of the betrothal, whether this remains the secret of the lovers, or is shared with the family, or publicly announced. The degree of power and perfection in which the feelings are aroused and disclosed in such a relationship is not dependent on its duration, although, indeed, a certain lapse of time is decidedly favorable to perfection. Moreover, it makes no difference to the strength of the

passion whether the marriage is looked upon as an attainable goal or not, or in whichever form it is represented. If we take the idea of the engagement in this wider sense, it coincides exactly with that of the real life of love, and in this way its limits cannot be confused with preparatory experiments, or love-dreams with its æsthetic illusions.

Practically, indeed, the line between love-testing experiments and the betrothal has been variously drawn by morality. There is certainly a danger, through vivid imagination, of mistaking the æsthetic hallucinations for real feelings, *i.e.*, of considering mere products of the fancy as real love. Nevertheless, the much more rapid dissipation, and traceless disappearance of the imagined feelings, make it moderately easy for us to discern their difference from real emotion, and to avoid confusing them. All the remarks of women in respect to their having loved truly more than once, originate in a non-appreciation of the difference between the æsthetic illusions of a life-like act of the imagination, and the real feeling of the heart. The imagined anticipation of the real love may, nevertheless, to a certain degree, be

indispensable to its ripeness, fulness, and magnificence. A girl striving after an ideal love, but incapable of developing a real feeling for her husband, is likely to become a more thankful object of affection than an unimaginative maiden who reacts too coarsely and vulgarly on the advances made to her. But when we attempt to extend this proposition to women practised in real love the difference between fancy and reality becomes most pronounced. The earnest man who has actually given up his soul to the wife of his choice expects as a return a pure, and where possible, a virgin heart. The sensualist who offers nothing, but merely craves for the satisfaction of his appetites, gives the preference for some time to such "experienced" women, until he too, requiring a more powerful attraction, yearns for a *virgo intacta* as the last and highest stimulus. On the other hand, the experienced and well-trying man is much more fit for a chaste woman than a novice in the field of love. It is only old maids who consider innocence an estimable quality in young men.

It scarcely needs proof that the preservation of all these diversities of conduct in which the

fundamental distinction of the sexes is expressed, could never have been demanded on utilitarian motives. It could only be justified by this reflection, that the fascination for cohabitation, *i.e.*, the sacrifice of the ego in favor of the next generation established by the teleology of Nature would cease, and with the neglect and gradual suppression of these differences, the progress of culture would receive its severest blow.¹

¹ Cp. with this essay my "Phän. des sittlichen Bewusst." pp. 672, 673, 692-6.

THE VITAL QUESTION OF THE FAMILY.

UNDER all circumstances, the life of families among the higher classes is, on the average, shorter than among the middle and lowest grades of society. But there has seldom been a time in which this want of proportion has reached such alarming dimensions as at present. It is difficult to give an exact proof of this statement, for the average life of a family is not directly dependent on the average life of the individuals constituting it. Moreover, we possess only fragmentary statistics bearing on the life-duration of the family of the middle and lowest orders. Nevertheless, this remark will not be disputed when it is considered that the three principal causes of these differences among the various classes have been considerably intensified of late. These are : the greater proportion of bachelors, the later mean age of marriage, and the smaller average number of

children falling to the share of each household. Besides these three conditions there is another whose effects it is far more difficult to estimate, and respecting which no statistical facts are yet forthcoming. Nevertheless, its force is none the less weakened. It is this. That in contrast to the stronger muscular action and vital power called forth by the employment of the working classes, the intense mental strain and sensual life of the higher ranks consume more nervous force ; and consequently the life of the race is much sooner spent. The power of propagation is more interfered with by the abuse of nervous force than by any other cause. Indeed, it acts in a two-fold manner. In the first place, in respect to the number and healthiness of the generation immediately following ; secondly and more particularly, in its effect on the vitality and productive capacities of the next generation, on which, more than on any other circumstance, depend the number and soundness of succeeding families. As regards its effect on the average number of children, it has already been mentioned among the above conditions ; but it must be considered a fourth factor in respect to its influence on the

healthiness, seminating powers, and average number of children of the second and following generations. In this latter aspect its force could only be calculated, if we possessed a comparative table of family statistics of the various orders and employments. We could almost believe that in the upper classes a just compensation is to be found for the longer mean extension of the individual life, in the shorter average life of the family, and that, considered from the standpoint of the whole, it is comforting to think that the families of the superior orders—even if they keep their ground among their own rank—make room for the advancement of the lower classes by a gradual process of extinction. Yet, in the interests of the whole, this satisfaction is very short-sighted. For it is overlooked that it is for the benefit of the whole to make the utmost of those acquired capabilities for social progress and culture in which the higher classes are so immeasurably superior to the lower. It is also of the greatest advantage to secure their future development, by further transmission, as far as this is possible. Industrious and exceptionally well constituted individuals and families should unquestionably

be allowed the opportunity of promotion to a higher rank, so that they might introduce new blood, and compel the older families to hold their own by a display of superior talents. It is undoubtedly expedient that the unsound, loafing, and unfavorably formed individuals of the higher orders should in no way be prevented from relapsing into a lower grade of society by social institutions. It is quite as expedient not to allow the capitalised possession of the work of past generations—as manifested in the superior characteristics of the higher classes—to be frivolously frittered away so long as anything can be done to guarantee their continuation for those yet unborn. For this reason we may very profitably enter more deeply into the causes of the increasing curtailment of the average family existence among the more cultured classes, and inquire what means there are at our disposal to remedy this growing calamity of our social-political life.

We must now mention another consequence of avoiding and postponing the matrimonial engagement. As a social evil it is of far-reaching extent. The symptomatic treatment to which it has hitherto been subjected has

served only to intensify its force. We call it the woman question—better still, the virgin question—or the problem of finding suitable work for those women who have missed their natural vocation ; and a solution can only be found by heroically attacking its ultimate conditions. It is a matter of common knowledge that the numbers of both sexes during youth are equal ; whilst in childhood the male sex is slightly, and in maturity the female is considerably, in excess of the other. Obviously, therefore, no virgin would remain unmated if every man, while young, would choose his helpmeet. The virgin question springs originally from the fact that the number of girls in their bloom is larger than the number of men of that maturer age, in which it is customary for the males of the higher classes to first think of matrimony, and that a portion of them prefer to remain unmarried. The training of women for independent occupations, proposed and persevered in, as a symptomatic solution of the virgin problem, only aggravates the evil. For in this way girls are made less fit for marriage, and the number of unmarried men and neglected maids is consequently increased.

This, in its turn, has the effect of making the problem still more acute, of emphasising the efforts to obtain a self-supporting employment. We can only avoid a vicious circle in our argument by recognising the increasing reluctance of men to be bound by the bonds of matrimony, as the sole condition of the girl question, and by devoting our energies to a palliation of this evil.

The fourth cause of the diminution of the family life—the quicker dissipation of the nervous force through intense mental strain and mental pleasure—cannot be substantially removed. The superior occupations naturally require higher and more concentrated mental effort, and even if it is contended that intense work demands intense pleasure as compensation, the pleasures and recreations of the cultured classes are undeniably of an intellectual kind, and make mental exertion indispensable, although different to that involved in mental toil. No human skill will ever devise a means of preventing the rapid disappearance of the cultured minority, because all the higher mental culture of mankind lies in this superiority of intellectual labor and intellectual pleasure.

Nothing remains but to comfort ourselves with the reflection that the falling away of the aristocracy is compensated for by the advance of the poorer classes. The more necessary is it, therefore, to urge the higher orders to avoid all excess in work and pleasure, to make full use of the opportunities for maintaining health allowed by their social position; to lead, in short, a more healthful life than their inferiors, whose pecuniary resources are limited. Above all, they should keep nerve-reviving, nocturnal sleep sacred, and therefore they should seek food which is not only nutritive, but which will not incite the passions. They should take as much exercise, breathe as much fresh air, as possible. The first half of the day should be devoted to work, the second to recreation; moderation and regularity should be observed in all things. The nervous effect of mental toil is to irritate the seminal organs, and consequently to dissipate the power of propagation. This is a great danger, and the longer it has time to work, *i.e.*, the higher the average marital age for men of the superior classes, the more serious does it become. All hygienic, æsthetic, and moral instruments should be em-

ployed to prevent the social evils which may possibly arise from a combination of intense excitation with a prolonged delay of marriage. The most efficacious remedy is to mitigate the nervous stimulation by healthful living and the avoidance of dietetic means of incitation.

It is not difficult to see that these conditions are mutually involved in their action. The nearer and more certain the goal of matrimony is, the easier it is for a young man to exercise self-control for a time; the more distant it is, and the more hopeless its prospect in accordance with his social position, the more difficult is self-restraint. On the other hand, the desire for marriage is not so powerful a motive as the inclination to spend a bachelor life. There must be a number of external motives which ultimately determine a young man to bend his neck beneath the marriage yoke. The other three causes act and re-act on each other in the same manner. A person with little prospect of marriage makes himself thoroughly acquainted with the life of a bachelor, and avoids all opportunities of nuptial union, so that it must be mainly due to chance, if he finally succumbs to the blandishments of the blind god. A man

who first begins to think of marrying when he has attained to a mature age has passed beyond the time of youthful impressionability, during which his heart might have been won by many a maid. When he ultimately decides to found a family he looks in vain for a maiden whom he can love ; and he either waits till it is altogether too late, or he contracts a loveless marriage from inappropriate motives.

If a man first marries when he is of ripe age, he will generally choose an older girl than if he were younger. The number of children resulting from such an union would therefore be curtailed on account of the age of the woman. Apart from this, the husband would reach an age when the marital functions usually lapse, after only a short period of cohabitation, even if the wife would have not yet lost all power of semination ; so that we have here a two-fold cause preventing the family reaching its due proportions. I am certainly not in favor of daughters of the higher classes marrying immediately after they have attained to the age of puberty, for we have to take account, not only of the number, but also of the constitution of the children, and of the mother's fitness for

her future functions. On the other hand, the postponement of the average nuptial age of girls till the 27th year is unnatural, because it weakens her youthful capacity without further promoting her fitness; and several children, which might have been produced between the 21st and 27th year of the mother, will for ever be lost to the world.

The same motives which prompt men to delay marriage, or to avoid it altogether, also create a loathing for a large family. Our ideas on the subject have reached such a degree of error and confusion, that the natural number of children of a normal marriage, where the contracting parties are young and healthful, is considered scandalous by the higher classes, and is looked upon as "canine fertility."¹

Where such views have vogue, they must naturally have a reactionary effect on the average marriage age, and more especially on that of the woman. For the longer a woman

¹ This, according to medical theories, amounts to 2 before the 20th year, 5 in the twenties, 3 in the thirties, and 1 in the forties—11 in all. If a woman marry at 26½ years, the number of children falls to half that sum, *i.e.*, 5½, which tallies with the statistic average in Germany.

delays her marriage, and the older the girl a man chooses for his wife, the less ground is there for anxiety concerning an over-abundance of children. The larger or smaller number of children is essentially only a question of money for the husband, since the wife has to bear all the burdens involved ; for the woman, however, it is a cardinal question of body and soul.

Preposterous views are rife among the women of certain classes, arising from an abstract idealism, and a spiritualism contrary to Nature. These have been utilised as a cloak for selfish comfort, avoidance of work, and pursuit of pleasure. In this way, a race of pampered and immoderate egoists have been produced, who do not mind undertaking the cares of motherhood once or twice—for otherwise they could not participate in its pleasures—but who would not further trouble themselves with their duties as wives, preferring to live in a state of undisturbed comfort and pleasure.

Nothing is more calculated to emphatically keep men away from matrimony than the dissemination of such opinions—as immoral as they are unnatural. For if the prospect is limited to only a few years of a natural

married life, then this price is not worth the sacrifice of their freedom. Moreover, if they have to continue, after a time, in an unnatural relation with a selfishly immoral wife, they might just as well have engaged in illicit connections with women, who, at least, do not parade their superfine honor and exaggerated virtue. Maidens desirous of obtaining all the advantages of wifehood by marriage, without honorably and absolutely undertaking all the corresponding duties imposed on them by nature and society, are simply trying to deceive the men about to marry them ; and they only receive their deserts if they themselves are betrayed, if they are left to spend a life of single-blessedness.

Unfortunately, the social community suffers by this solution, and, therefore, such intensely egotistic ideas cannot be too arduously and opportunely contested. Maidens cannot learn too early that they have higher functions to perform than the mere satisfaction of pleasures. It is their task to add to the State as many sound and well-trained citizens as they are capable of producing, so that it may engage triumphantly in the struggle for national existence.

Is it not grossly scandalous that the average total of legitimate births in all modern civilised countries should be inadequate to secure them from retrogression and gradual annihilation ; that the German people are indebted to the sacrifices brought to the altar of the State by the mothers of illegitimate offspring for their increase, through which alone they are enabled to maintain themselves victorious against France? Is it not shameful that, instead of going beyond their due in the performance of this civic duty, the higher classes fall hopelessly below the average, and add to the other burdens of the working classes that of making up for their neglect? In this way, by preserving those least developed, they are subverting the principle of natural selection.

✓ The unnaturally selfish reluctance of many girls of the higher classes to fully perform their duties as wives, prevents men from selecting mates from their own station. They see that in such a marriage they will be confronted with the following alternatives : either, under the pressure of pecuniary motives, they must fall with a good grace into the class of the betrayed, or they must force their wives into a

fulfilment of their engagement, at the cost of connubial peace and domestic happiness.

A still more obvious cause for the increase of bachelors, and those who marry late, is the ever-growing tendency to live above one's position.

It is undeniable that, in spite of the more rapid increase of population, the standard of living of all classes has risen remarkably during the last 150 years. The working classes of to-day, who complain of the insufficiency of their wages, can scarcely conceive in what misery their ancestors lived. The older members of the middle classes of all grades can very well recollect the puritanical simplicity prevailing in their grandfathers' houses. In spite of the rapid multiplication of people, the standard of comfort is higher now than formerly. This is to be exclusively accounted for by the fact, that the stored-up force of the sun's rays of past ages which we extract from the earth in the shape of coals, produces, by means of our machines, immeasurably more commodities than one nation can utilise. The superfluity of these manufactured articles is, therefore, exchanged for the agricultural

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products of other lands and countries. We may thus explain the reason why the desire for personal comfort has become so much more intense at present, and has partly degenerated into a morbid self-gratification. In the first place, the increasing class of the exceedingly rich finds, in the refined products of our time, the means of satisfying all its fastidious and delicate cravings, and rouses the inferior classes to emulate it. Secondly, the democratically levelling tendency of the age revolts more and more against present social institutions which sanction an unfair distribution of happiness, and demands that the pleasures of the privileged classes should be enjoyed by peer and by peasant equally.

This hankering after the pleasures of the higher classes has both its advantages and disadvantages. The vigor of the struggle to gain a footing on a higher rung of the social ladder essentially depends on the intensity with which every class longs to participate in the pleasures and privileges of the class above it. This struggle is a most important factor of the progress of culture, because it educes the best qualities of the combatants. Conse-

quently, the longing to add to one's comfort is, in this respect, a decided advantage to the community. On the other hand, it magnifies the danger of sacrificing the future, or rather the real opportunities of the social advance of the family, for immediate and transitory comfort. In other words, the object so eagerly sought after—the attainment of a comfortable living—is given up for its mere shadow. In this way, what should be the means of accelerating the progress of culture, becomes really the obstacle to the social rise of the family.

The frivolity which expends the means for climbing higher in momentary enjoyment goes hand in hand with the vanity that prefers glittering ornaments and hollow mummeries to the real possession of a more favorable position. Therefore, the impulse to improve one's position is only economically sound, and socially justifiable and expedient, when it prompts families to acquire more substance. It becomes ruinous when it induces one to anticipate the object of the desire with the wealth at one's immediate disposal; if, that is to say, it leads to intemperate luxury. An immoderate lust for show, that transcends one's riches, leads to

retrogression, and finally to ruin, just as an unusually dull craving for luxury prevents the progress of a nation's culture, and condemns it to a state of vegetation.

What applies to whole nations will apply equally well to single classes and families. Nothing can so unfailingly hasten the ruin of native nobility, than its morbid desire not to allow itself to be surpassed in luxury by the moneyed parvenues. The cry against the increasing mortgages of large landed estates should be directed against the impetus given to the rapid rise in the prices of goods, by the advance in the habits of those families directly or indirectly deriving their daily bread from them. The salaried classes, wrongfully, for the most part, complain that their pay has not risen proportionately to the depreciation of gold. Their social position has only relatively been made less favorable, because the living habits of the rich, and the nobility who emulate them, have undergone considerable development within the last few generations. By comparing themselves with these classes that are closely allied to their own, they feel in the highest degree dissatisfied with the same posi-

tion with which former members of the class were well content. The officer who, more than others, has occasion to avoid all enervating influences, and should win honor by spartan asceticism, has been more and more brought into an idiotic competition with those blessed with superfluous cash. The error of this class-feeling becomes more pronounced the less possible it is for the individual member to revolt against its glaring immorality. It is only because all ranks of society, with the exception of the moneyed few, have more wants than their means can gratify, that dissatisfaction is rampant, and complaints are made concerning inadequacy of income.

The same classes, who, formerly, by spending a less luxurious life, had sufficient left to rear a respectably large family modestly but well, and could still save up for a rainy day, require now, under the new conditions, an income of at least equal value for themselves alone, or for a far smaller family. The few children they bring up are pampered and spoiled, and are left after the death of their parents in a helpless position, contrasting most painfully with their former state of over-indulgence. Luxurious

living has left nothing for their support. The children, accustomed to live above their station, are the marriage candidates of the next generation. Is it then surprising if the sons hesitate to marry, and spend their earnings on themselves, and if the hopeless daughters join the ill-starred ranks of old maids, or worse still, sink into the abyss of shame and despair?

Death, or rather annihilation, is the retribution for economical sin in the family, as well as in the class or nation. Where the consciousness of a natural social solidarity prevails, this knowledge works as a conflicting force against economical error. But it is precisely the most dangerous phase of the individualising and levelling tendencies of our age, that the individual thinks only of himself and his right to live, and not of his relationship to other members of society, and his duty towards them. "*Après nous le déluge*" is the motto of the selfish pursuit of pleasure. The world may go on afterwards without me as it pleases, as long as I have extracted as much enjoyment out of life as possible. Thus moral error and confusion lie really at the basis of economical wrong. From an ethical point of view, families

which allow their members to be hardened in this immoral selfishness deserve to die out and to be replaced by new blood.

Fortunately, such extreme phenomena are not by any means general, although, in a smaller degree, the tendency to live luxuriously has undoubtedly affected the whole social body. Within the husk of our higher classes there is planted a kernel of surpassing soundness. To these rare members of their order I appeal to recognise the possible evil consequences of this senseless class spirit, to take their stand nobly against it, and, by an energetic reaction, to guide it along healthier roads.

Since I have already noticed the fact that it is mainly the softer sex whose egoism is in danger of making them revolt against the unconditional and willing performance of their duties, we should, in justice, add that it is the sterner sex who are mostly prevented from marrying by financial considerations. For, as the wife has to endure the more difficult part of the natural burdens, the husband has to bear the brunt of the social duties, and to look after the support of the whole family. A wife must rely on her husband for the maintenance of the

family. She suffers if she makes a mistake, but she incurs no responsibility. The man, on marrying, undertakes the sole responsibility of adequately supporting his wife and children. He is, therefore, unwilling to marry until he is capable of fulfilling this condition. From a pecuniary point of view, most girls rush heedlessly on to marriage, even when they are in other matters seriously inclined. They are carried along by a certain fatalism to a fulfilment of their duties, and by the soothing reflection that all anxiety, in this respect, is to be relegated to the husband. They think so highly of their natural avocation, and of the advantages of wifehood, that they willingly suppress their critical faculty, and give themselves to an illusion concerning the future, which they would undoubtedly detect in the case of any of their friends. She is, therefore, always prepared to allay the care and hesitation of an otherwise welcome lover, and in order to make his decision less difficult, she is ready to assure him of the modesty of her wants, her contentment, her desire for work, and her power of making sacrifices. These promises are not wilful lies, but good resolutions, which she

honestly thinks herself capable of carrying out. When a maiden loves, she considers no obstacle great enough to prevent her wedding the man of her choice.

Unfortunately, the bride's promises are not to be depended upon, and all good resolutions are often mere paving-stones on the road to a conjugal hell. The old habits reassert themselves. All chances of happiness are at an end. Even if the wife is reasonable enough to suffer unavoidable privations, she does so impatiently. The constant dissatisfaction of the wife deprives the husband of all domestic comfort. At one time it is the clothing, ornaments and finery, at another the character of the dwelling, its size, the number of servants, the food, the quality of her acquaintances, her amusements and recreations, which compare very unfavorably with those of her prenuptial state, and which inspire her with feelings of discontent. It may happen that the old customs are suppressed in favor of new ones. Generally, however, the memory of former comforts hardens and embitters the woman increasingly the longer she remains dissatisfied. Her quiet pain, whether sullenly or patiently endured,

has a worse effect on the mental peace of the husband than open complaints and reproaches. Worse than all are hysteria and melancholy, which constantly threaten to develop into madness if her will is not satisfied, and her depression dissipated by diversions. The husband has to strain every nerve to obtain the money necessary to satisfy her desires. If he should want to use this money, which is sufficient to gratify his wife's craving, for the purpose of supporting his family, she would consider it an encroachment on her rights. Every attempt on the part of the husband to increase his family must appear criminal to the wife, should his income be already inadequate to appease all her wants. In this case, her natural selfishness combines with economic considerations to defeat the goal of marriage. The cruel, heartless, and selfish thoughtlessness with which a woman tries to encumber her husband with all her burdens is as remarkable as the sacrifice, energy and endurance, which the same woman, were she unmarried or widowed, would devote to the nurture of her young under the iron heel of necessity.

Fortunately, the above statements are not the rule, but the exception, although not a rare one. Some of these female characteristics will, on close attention, be found to exist oftener than one imagines. Every man about to marry is bound to consider the possible prospect of such a future. At all events, he should place no reliance on the promises and good resolutions of his *fiancée*.

I have always wondered at the wife in the lowest station. She undertakes the sole care of the house, has to depend on obliging neighbors for help during her confinement, rears the children herself, and ekes out the scanty income of the family by her own manual labor. In addition, she has to tolerate the vulgarity of a thoughtless and occasionally intoxicated husband. And with what prospect? In the event of her becoming a widow, she will be thrown entirely on her own resources, in the rearing and educating of her children. This humbly-placed woman bears the decidedly greater portion of life's burdens. The manner in which she endures her overwhelming hardships commands our highest respect for her moral worth, which is as far superior to that

of the man, as in the higher classes, the man's is superior to the woman's. In the lower orders of society, it is principally the husband who is the cause of unfortunate marriages and divorces ; in the higher ranks, the woman is more often the guilty party. The woman of the lower classes is certainly more cultured and lovable than the man, while in the upper classes the reverse holds good.

The reason is obvious. The girls and women of the higher classes, spoiled by want of hard work, are accustomed to the thought that work and suffering are the natural lot of men, and they therefore bring themselves to find the aim of existence in comfort and pleasure. There is no time for a girl to become acquainted with domestic work whilst she is still at school. There are five hours of school instruction, with two to three of home lessons. About one is occupied in going to school, and no inconsiderable part of the day is taken up in private lessons. By the time she has left, at the age of 15 to 17, she has already learned to play the part of a lady, too refined and educated for household labor. Even if she is otherwise inclined, there is no work worthy of the name, in

a house fully equipped with servants. From the 16th to the 20th year she is therefore compelled to spend her time in idleness, if she is not engaged in scientific or artistic studies, which render her still more unfit for her future occupation as housewife. The one thing she generally learns is to fritter away her useless time with more or less grace. This is done by reading the newest French and German novels (the sole fruit of her study of languages), by piano-playing, or by eye-destroying, purposeless handwork. Every desire for work, every feeling of civic duty, every shame for a purely parasitic life and undeserved prosperity, are radically destroyed in this way.

It is not surprising, then, if a young lady brought up in such fashion is horrified at the idea of becoming mistress of a household with no help save that of a general servant; and where her own cooking, and dressmaking, and still worse, the daily and nightly attendance on her children, will fall on her own shoulders. She will, at the utmost, undertake to superintend the arrangements of a home well fitted with servants. Even this is in glaring contrast to the apathetic laziness to which she is accus-

tomed. To accept a man who cannot afford to engage a cook and nurse girl, and to have all the dressmaking done by strange hands, appears to her such an overwhelming sacrifice that it cannot be outweighed by a life-long devotion on his part.

As a rule, a maid about to marry thinks only of the ceremony, the trousseau, and the honeymoon; and she is willing to undertake any burdens connected with them. When the children make their appearance, requiring a nurse, clothes, a larger dwelling and table, the fault is laid entirely on the husband, and he must develop his resources to satisfy these new wants. If he cannot afford to allow his wife to live as luxuriously as she wishes, he makes a martyr of her; or, at any rate, he is considered to have increased the martyrdom, which she endures "for his sake," in the shape of repeated pregnancy and childbirth.

It never enters her mind that her husband's occupation, which is undertaken for the support of the family, entails a far severer martyrdom on him than she suffers by fulfilling all her natural duties, and that it shortens his life in a far greater degree. Even the husband

himself wilfully ignores the fact that his work undermines his health, and gradually consumes him, and that the earlier stages of decay escape observation. But the interference of a woman's vocation with her comfort is at once apparent, though it is often forgotten, that this disturbance is only temporary, and for the most part is fully remedied after a time. Women seldom fail to call attention to the suffering they must endure in fulfilling their natural duties, more especially when they are nervous or hysterical.

How many women are there in the higher classes who are not nervous? How many are there who are physically competent to bear their womanly burdens? How many are able to combine daily work and attendance on children, with a disturbed night's rest, for a number of years, without adding intolerably to their nervousness? Owing to the senseless blood-letting of the last century, we have become an anæmic and chlorotic race. Moreover, our nerves have become debilitated by the town life of the present age, with its artificial excitements, its lack of fresh air and exercise. Besides, the delicately constructed female brain is irrationally overstrained in our

high girls' schools between the ages of five and sixteen, and is further injured by employing it afterwards in arduous studies. In this way we have rendered the female organism, which has already been considerably damaged by the tight-lacing of the last generations, still more unfit for its natural functions. No wonder then if the spirit begins to revolt against the realisation of natural ends, for which it feels that the body is physically unfit. The maiden's heart, yearning for love and happiness, is involuntarily forced into a platonic abstract idealism, in which it fondly imagines that it can take lasting possession of a man's heart, without the natural basis of love. Our whole system of female education, aiming as it does at a scrupulously careful concealment of this natural foundation, its wisdom and its dignity, strengthens the error so soothing to female selfishness. The husband has to suffer for this skilful self-deceit. His natural conduct is looked upon as senseless barbarity and thoughtless cruelty. Even if the woman is unable to persuade her husband that he is acting wrongly to her, she, at any rate, adequately convinces him of her unhealthiness and selfish-

ness. It is due to this cause, as well as to the wife's dissatisfaction with her position, that the love of the husband waxes weaker and weaker, till it becomes a pale reflex of its former strength. When it reaches this point, the husband, neglected and jaded, listens eagerly to the promptings of his egoistic instincts. The consequence is, the smaller number of children in the families of the higher, compared with those of the lower classes.

Young men reflect very seldom on the facts here set forth. Yet they have a more or less clear knowledge of the physical and spiritual impotence, the loathing for work, the self-indulgence, and selfishness of the girls of the more cultured classes, for they know their own sisters. They therefore instinctively fear marriage, and prefer the rôle of a flirting bachelor to that of a deceived husband. At no previous period have young men fought more shy of love, under whose infatuation their eyes might be blinded to the truth. They have never before put such a high price on their bachelorhood, and hope they might be spared the disappointment of marrying a poor maid. Even if a large percentage are deceived in this hope, yet

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this general aversion of the educated youth to a marriage with a moneyless girl is a highly dangerous sign of the times, a symptom of overwhelming selfishness, of the lack of a sense of duty to family and society. No man can doubt that there are enough dutiful women, even among the indigent virgins of his own class; that if he wishes to marry in his own position, he must take the trouble to find out these exceptions; that, in the event of being deceived in his marriage, it is part of his duty to fight against the selfishness of his wife, and to remedy her neglected education; that, finally, urged on by his unavailing attempt to overcome the egoism of his wife, he should give his daughters a sounder training, and thus help to inaugurate an era of social improvement. Unfortunately, these female faults are used by the male youth as a pretext for humoring their own selfishness, which urges them to an undisturbed enjoyment of their whole income. A young man who desires all his earnings for himself is naturally averse to the idea of suddenly setting the major portion aside for a family. He postpones his marriage till he has a larger income. This object attained, he probably has

no definite woman in view, and he then finds that he wants his higher income for his own personal requirements. If he is overcome by real love, he is prepared to make a sacrifice, and to limit his luxuries. It generally happens that his self-denial does not turn out to be so great as he imagined. But the woman, as we have seen, falls into the opposite error of taking too rose-coloured a view of her prospective marriage. If, at the time when his income is capable of maintaining a family, his heart, as is too often the case, has not been touched by that true love which would overcome his selfish feelings, they would be sufficiently powerful to prevent him performing the social duty of rearing a family. Unquestionably, there are enough young men who, although unaffected by the darts of Cupid, are fully prepared to sacrifice much personal comfort in order to participate in the happiness and contentment that the domestic hearth alone can afford. But they are not certain of this happiness with the pampered and immoderate girls of his class. They are afraid that all their sacrifices are futile, and that their life will be embittered by a union with a grumbling and importunate wife.

The unsparing dissection of the causes that give rise to the increased avoidance and delay of marriage may be painful to many readers. It has, at least, this advantage: it gives us a clue to the remedy of present social evils. In the first place, the legislature may do something to remove the premium on bachelorhood.

A father of a family has to pay the same direct taxes as a bachelor, notwithstanding that he adds to his civic burdens by rearing a family, and by larger indirect contributions to the national exchequer. Again, single and married heirs have equal claims to the patrimony of an intestate. Let us first consider the former point.

If justice is to be done, taxation should take into account whether an income is to support one or five persons; in other words, an unmarried taxpayer of a similar income should pay five times as much as a paterfamilias in direct taxation. We cannot re-adopt the Athenian law compelling a healthy citizen to marry when he has arrived at the age of 40 (as a short time ago children were subjected to compulsory baptism), but we can impress on our citizens the necessity of performing the

civic duty of marriage. We can punish the unwilling by adding to their direct taxation, as we do persons who refuse certain honorary offices of the State. We should make no difference in sex. The deterioration of the sex must be punished in the taxable spinsters, however innocent they may individually be of the charge of remaining unmarried, for the State can pay no special regard to individual cases. Since the lower classes have been, and are being, relieved of a portion of their fiscal burdens, the old maid who works for her living should not be made to pay this tax. Only those women who are pecuniarily fortunate should be called upon to suffer this extra impost.¹ Since the neglect of the social duty of founding a household is the more harmful and punishable the more prosperous the single individuals are, it would only be just to institute a graduated system of taxation. For the

¹ If we want to be scrupulously just, we need only insert the clause that old maids who have taken an oath not to marry should be exempted from this extra tax. Anyone, however, who has any knowledge of female nature would not doubt for a moment that this provision would never be used, and that, therefore, its incorporation in the law would be superfluous and ineffectual.

better the position the more worthy element is the avoidance of marriage, more disadvantageous is the accumulation of property, resulting from a scanty provision. In the lower classes, where the increase is quick rather than too slow, everything has been done to encourage reproduction, the removal of the difficulties and costs of marriage, and by abolishing, where necessary, marriage fees. In the higher classes, where the increase is alarmingly below the average, marriage has hitherto shrunk from imposing a tax on the unmarried, a proceeding that is naturally demanded by justice.

We now come to the second point, to the injustice of married and single sharing equally in the inheritance of family property. Old maids leading an idle and less life, and bachelors undertaking communal burdens outside their usual employment, do not deserve to take the same share of the family property as their brothers and sisters. For the single is obliged to live much more sparingly on equal income, on account of their greater needs. Even if the shares of the single

uncles ultimately go to the nephews and nieces, they are received too late for the State to reap their full economic value. What is still worse, the income of this property is lost to the socially active portion of the community during the lives of the uncles and aunts, and by immoderately raising their standard of comfort and luxury, it acts as an obvious stimulus to single-blessedness. On the other hand, many an egoistic bachelor would settle himself much earlier in marriage, and many a happily-placed and dainty girl would be more sparing in her refusals, did they know that half of their inheritance would be taken from them if they remained single. In order to attain this end, the law of intestacy must be so altered, that where the heirs have equal pretensions, the single ones should receive only half as much as the married. Those who, at the death of the intestate, are unmarried and under 35, should be allowed to claim that the other half of their portion should be held in reserve, in the event of their marrying before that age. Should this condition not be fulfilled, then their shares should be divided among the married co-heirs. Any one not

approving of this proceeding may dispose of his property otherwise,—by testament. Since most people die without leaving any will, a reform in the law of intestacy in the direction here indicated would, no doubt, exercise a considerable influence.

I estimate the moral result of such legal reforms far higher than their actual effect. For they would awaken and strengthen the idea among the people, that the socially active and passive members of society have such a different social value as not to be measured by the same standard. The proposition, "He who does not toil shall not eat," should so far be restored into favor, that the culpable avoidance of civic duties should be exposed to contempt, that male and female idlers should no longer spend a luxurious life in defiance of honorable work, but should be limited to a modest expenditure; and that citizens not fulfilling the civic duty of family-rearing should not be endowed with equal rights with those more able and willing to bear their share of the burdens of the State. The smug bachelor must cease rubbing his hands with pleasure, boasting of his cleverness, and looking down

scornfully on the stupid dolt, who labors with the sweat of his brow for his numerous family. The mocking contempt with which old maids, through no fault of their own, are too often regarded, should be transferred with double force to old bachelors, who were once physically fit for marriage. For they had no need to wait to be wooed; with themselves rested the choice. Disdain should rise to moral indignation if the avoidance of marital duties is coupled with abstention from work. The latter fault, at least, cannot, under present circumstances, be levelled against old maids.

If, in this way, the feeling of marital obligation is revived in our young men, and its neglect considered shameful, they would learn to view their future with totally different eyes, and would adapt their present life accordingly. When living for themselves they never dream of doing otherwise than spending their entire income on their own persons. But if they were to look upon their bachelorhood as a preparatory stage to matrimony, they would cultivate habits conformable to the standard of this latter state. They would find it much easier to avoid such soul-destroying vices as

gambling, etc., if they directed their aims to a family life. With the prospect of a rapidly approaching marriage, they will prefer to save the cost of maintaining illicit sensual relations, and by so doing destroy the main motive for an over-elaborate toilet. The more imbued they are with the idea of fitting themselves for a future family life, the more will they prefer the attractions of the home circle to those of the drinking-house; the more successfully will they withstand the temptations of the drinking-house to habits of immoderate meat-eating, drinking, and smoking; the less desire will they have for sacrificing the refreshing effects of nocturnal slumbers; and the more care will they take of their health, and the preservation of their nervous force. Fortunately, smoking amongst the cultured youth is beginning to lose vogue, a fate which has already befallen tobacco-chewing and snuff-taking. A reaction is also taking place among students themselves against senseless drinking; and medical men are now beginning to protest against the long-approved-of practice of unstinted flesh-gorging. Anyone accustomed to a healthy diet, and who neither smokes, drinks, nor gambles, has no

need to make a single sacrifice on his marriage. Moreover, he would be under no temptation to spend all his income on himself while a bachelor, but would commence to save in good time, either in the shape of actual savings, or of insurance against old age and death. Such a person has everything to gain by inaugurating a family life, provided, of course, that his choice fall on a healthy, unpretentious maid, able and willing to work. It is the most natural thing to seek such a girl in his own position, when the spirit of the age and of his class is a sound one. It is as dangerous to do so when this spirit is corrupt, and there is a general tendency to immorally enhance the standard of living, as it is under normal circumstances to marry above his station. No one has a right to consider himself a correct reader of the human heart; least of all when Cupid blinds the mental vision. Accordingly no one can trust himself to make such a searching examination of the character of his betrothed as to place unhesitating confidence in her promises, that she will never hunger after more luxurious habits than he can afford to indulge her in. Since this is impos-

sible, the candidate for matrimony must have recourse to objective manifestations. He sees whether the gratification of habits to which his *fiancée* was accustomed in her parents' house are beyond his income. If this is the case, there must be no mistake in his mind, that even the best and most modest of women, who willingly submit to their new and humbler circumstances, will never cease to view their condescension as a sacrifice to be compensated for by a greater abundance of love than is usually demanded. It is an easy thing for a man to elevate the wife of his choice to his own plane ; for most women are remarkably apt in fitting themselves for the needs of a higher position, and in making themselves at home in higher circles. On the other hand, it is infinitely difficult for woman so to adapt herself to the lower level of her husband, that he should not feel it as an act of graciousness. The woman never compares the married state with what would have been her lot had she remained a spinster after the death of her parents, but with the life she led under the paternal roof. For she does not trouble herself about abstract possibilities, but considers

her actual experiences as the only criterion of comparison. Should this comparison of her former life with her present married state result unfavorably to the latter, no allusion to what would probably have happened in its stead is of any avail ; for it is indisputable that she might have made a better match.

If a man wishes to be secure, he must limit his choice to such families of his position who have successfully withstood the corrupt tendencies of the age ; who have brought up their daughters simply and modestly ; and have so accustomed them to work, that they can accept the fate awaiting them without any condescension or unlearning of old habits.

A man whose prospective yearly income at 30, 40, 50 and 60 years does not exceed £150, £200, £250, £300, respectively (which is actually the case on the average among the higher occupations), can only live happily and comfortably with a wife who has both the power and will to do her own cooking, nursing, and dressmaking ; and to be relieved only of the rough house-work. He can only look for such a wife in a family, employing at the utmost one servant ; and where possible, only an occasional

charwoman ; observing the greatest moderation in food, clothing, dwelling, travelling, etc. He certainly should not go to a family where the grown-up daughters are accustomed to be waited on, instead of themselves attending to their parents and the whole of the family. If he finds no such family in his own class, and none whose daughters have succeeded in gaining his love, he must not on that account consider himself released from his duty. The simple remedy is to descend so far from his level, that the intellectual and moral education of the daughters is adequate to ensure his children the necessary maternal training.

If this were the general practice of the male youth, those families living above their station would find their punishment in their daughters' spinsterhood. Only those who were wise would receive in the exceptional marriage of their daughters the reward for the courage and endurance with which they struck out against the stream. If young men chose their wives from a lower class, instead of intermarrying with families living above their position, the deteriorated female portion of the higher classes would be precluded from propagation at the

same time that the inherited characteristics of civilisation would be preserved among the males. Instead of the introduction of fresh life, by the elevation of totally new elements, we should have a half-sided renewal of blood by intermarriage with the more refined daughters of the next lowest grade. It has at least this advantage. It preserves the inherited qualities of the male portion for the participation of the class in the work of culture. At the same time, there is a distinct necessity to demand that every means possible should be taken to keep the female half of the higher classes from such utter annihilation.

The most effective means would be, the consciousness of this threatened disappearance, owing to the marriage of the men with girls of a lower class. For the ultimate motive of women to indulge in luxury is only the hope of blinding men by an appearance of superiority over the level of their station, and of making themselves more fascinating and lovable. Once the female race is persuaded that these efforts have precisely the opposite result, they would soon be dropped. The inducement leading girls to this

conduct is based on an illusion. They confuse the power of attraction exercised by a maiden over a man in a passing flirtation with that inducing him to propose marriage to her. It is only the former kind that girls in society and at balls have at their command. The latter is altogether beyond their comprehension. A little reflection would soon show them that the beauties most sought after in balls and parties remain spinsters as often, if not more often, than the wall-flowers neglected and despised. It is sad to think that mothers are, in a great measure, responsible for this mistake. They will not after marriage give up that social success which is partly attributable to luxurious ostentation; what is worse, they seek to repair the lost charms of their youth by extravagance in dress. Such mothers are rightly punished, if their daughters are left to languish in solitary misery.

It may be said that the most palpable cause of the perverted ideas of our women-folk lies in the girls' high school system, as it has been developed in the last fifty years. If we could put an end to this system with one stroke and set our daughters back to the level of educa-

tion with which our grandmothers were satisfied, then as little as they did, would they consider themselves too refined and cultured to perform their natural and social duties—nursing and housework. The girl problem has been intensified by the fact that young girls will not now, as formerly, work and serve in the household of their relatives. All half-education is a curse and not a blessing, and our system of higher education for women is half-education of the worst kind, and is naturally attended with all its evil results.

But a fifty years' development cannot be so summarily dealt with, and even in these girls' schools there are some eminently practicable elements which should not be radically removed, even if it were possible. I am content with demanding that schooling till the age of fourteen should consist of four hours daily; after that age, of three only (with the exception of those hours devoted to arithmetic and singing), only one foreign language (French) should be taught, and that not more than one hour should be occupied with home lessons. In this way the unhealthy overtaxing of the young girl's brain would be avoided, and a greater opportunity

would be given to the school girl of engaging in the work of the family. The extension of the school time till the 11th or 12th year, with 2 hours daily instruction in the last 2 years, would make the, at present, sharp passage from the school to the home more gradual. It would also give to the school the opportunity of furthering such studies, as the history of art, with real use. These subjects are now only on show in the school circular, and turn the girls' heads with a belief in the education acquired.

It is the function of the mother to accustom her daughters, earnestly and zealously, both while at school and after their school days are over, to orderly and useful domestic work. It is the duty of the father to keep a hand on his pocket against the encroachments of his grown-up daughters as well as his grown-up sons. If he yields to them they will easily grow accustomed to an immoderate expenditure, which will have to be considerably curtailed after marriage or after the father's death, and which curtailment they will then feel as a painful disappointment. If every paterfamilias was always mindful of his duty to arrange his household, not in accordance with the means

momentarily at his disposal, but with an eye to the future of his family, his sons and daughters would be adequately prepared to play their part when called upon to preside over a home of their own.

THE COMFORTS OF PESSIMISM.

DURING the last few decades, pessimism has fallen into great disrepute in Germany. It has been ridiculed, deprecated, and made the butt of cheap sarcasms ; it has been condemned for its impracticability, and for its paralysing and narcotic influences ; but it has not yet been controverted. There is certainly nothing more blame-worthy or despicable than that aversion to the world which springs from a helpless ennui ; which considers the grapes sour because it can no longer enjoy them, having deadened all taste for them by immoderate indulgence. Unworthy, also, is that world-hatred of weakly constituted mollusc-souls, whose bones and muscles are devoid of all resisting power, whose over-delicate nervous system is pervious to the slightest attack, who, however, revel with real delight in the depths of their ecstatic pain. This nervous world-disgust, with its sickly Larmoyance, is to be

equally condemned with that arising from ennui. If the latter owes its origin to an acquired impotence, the former does to an innate helplessness. Pessimism is most frequently caused by a combination of the two. But granted that psychical and physical abnormalities lead to an abhorrence of the world, and that even in modern times these causes have produced the greatest number of pessimists, does it follow that what has escaped the notice of the busy man in the stress of his instinctive strivings and occupation has therefore no existence at all? Or does not the lack of observation spring rather from a natural frivolity of temperament, or a superabundance of work, which will not allow him to look deeply enough into himself; so that it is the self-reflection produced by illness which must give him the first hint?

The adoption of pessimism is not in itself reproachable; but the inner motives giving rise to it may be open to blame. It is possible that a certain constitution of character may incline a man in perfect health to look at the darker side of things; to be more easily subject to anxiety and fear, than to hope and

confidence ; so that it is only necessary for such a person to place himself, once in his life, in a state of philosophic abstraction, and to take the sum total of his experiences.¹

But when the calmly-reflective thinker of average temperament makes his appearance, and by means of a cool and disinterested dissection of life finds a justification for pessimism, can the odium, which, through the inner causes of its adoption, has brought discredit on the principles themselves, be justly considered as inherent ; or should it be utilised to cast suspicion on the source from which the thinker has drawn his conviction ? Since the nature

¹ If he does this, one can easily believe that his Dyskoly was the result of his pessimistic theory of the world, the truth being that the former helps to bring the latter about. With characters, which are not naturally prone to Dyskoly, pessimism, in and for itself, would in no way have the effect of making them abstain from the real delights of life, but from the illusory, which produce more disgust than pleasure. The value of a piece of music, the power of science, and the flavor of oysters and champagne, are the same for the pessimists as for the optimists ; except that while the latter takes them as a matter of course, without giving the proper attention to the pleasure, for the pessimist every pleasant experience stands out by contrast more prominently from the dark background of his general view of life.

of that world-hatred, which first manifested itself in a poetic garb, has now become an object of science, the question as to its truth has also become a purely scientific one; and the arguments in its favor can only be quashed on scientific and real grounds. *This has hitherto not taken place.*

So long as science and thought had not taken this subject within their ken, optimism and pessimism existed side by side as two instinctive and unjustified views of the universe. Optimism, as a belief springing from the living aspiration to Nature's goal—life,—represented the ideas of sound and normal men; pessimism, on the other hand, before the advent of scientific thought, could have only found a place by means of a breaking away from the will to live. From the standpoint of a, so to speak, metaphysical physiology it could therefore only be described as an illness. In India, however, and in Mediæval Christendom, it assumed large dimensions—just as in most modern times it seems to have struck new soil among the Slavs.

With the introduction of the scientific point of view, an attempt was made to establish the

naïve ideas of the healthy man on a basis of reasoning. Leibnitz explained evil as negative, and, properly speaking, privative, *i.e.*, as illusory. Schopenhauer, as the representative of the opposite opinion, treated pleasure as negative and really privative, regarding it as a mere illusion to consider it positive. We may call the one view absolute optimism, the other absolute pessimism. Both overshoot their mark. Further reflection makes it soon apparent in the optimism of Leibnitz that evil, as a matter of fact, has also a positive reality, and that it can only be a question of *balance* and not of the exclusive existence of (little or much) pleasure. The Schopenhauerian school should take the same step, and admit that pleasure may be as positive as pain, and that it is a matter of *balance* and not of an exclusive existence of (little or much) pain. Relative optimism teaches the necessary balance of pleasure; relative pessimism the inevitable preponderance of pain. If the balance of one or the other did not follow unfailingly from natural conditions, but were merely a matter of chance, and could, therefore, at any time be replaced by its opposite, it would be impossible

to establish any systematic doctrine of the subject.

Optimism fights with arguments which are only sound, if human aspirations and strivings were not directed to illusory matters. The absolute pessimism of Schopenhauer, on the other hand, treats these illusions as if they were entirely non-existent, whereas they certainly do produce real phenomena in the deluded mind. But since all progress is associated with the advance of truth, and the destruction of illusions, pessimism is in practice constantly gaining more ground, whilst optimism is losing it; so that the arguments of Schopenhauer are based on foundations theoretically right, and more applicable to experience, whilst those of the optimists are only relatively right from the standpoint of illusion. They are, therefore, not only in a hopeless state of increasing vagueness, but they must also be considered as untenable by science, which dispels—at least theoretically—all illusions. From a scientific point of view then, in spite of all its defamation, no trustworthy arguments have been brought against the pessimism of Schopenhauer; nothing but

hollow declamation. In one point only does Schopenhauer seem vulnerable; namely, in the Quietism which he derives from his system. It has been urged that such a view of existence is utterly destructive of all civil and social life, and of all historical development of mankind, a matter which Schopenhauer altogether failed to understand. Every man, consequently, having an inclination towards a practical life, must shrink from a pessimism whose inseparability from Quietism has been prudently allowed to have been demonstrated. Nevertheless, its theoretic truth has not yet been disproved.

But is it really the case that Quietism is the inevitable consequence of pessimism, or is it only the result of certain false premises which Schopenhauer held in common with the Buddhists? Is it not rather the fact, that true pessimism leads to a more energetic occupation with life's work than any other theory of the universe? According to Schopenhauer, the impossibility of a real historical development follows from the ideality of Time. There exists no process able to guide the world to a goal. The universe is constantly

revolving in the same spot, and even the process of this revolution is merely a subjective phenomenon. To what purpose then should man work if he can advance no further? It is to the *Transcendental Idealism* of Schopenhauer that we must look for the real and true origin of his Quietism, and not to his pessimism. He is also of opinion that the individual, with his hope for liberation, has to depend purely on himself; he must rely on his own efforts to rescue himself from the fiery circle. He does not recognise the solidarity of the yearning for salvation; a participation in the common work of redemption by the whole of mankind. Why should I trouble myself with the progress of the whole, when the only thing attainable is to save my own person from the whirlpool of the world? In the *egoistic isolation* of his striving for salvation—contradictory to his own monistic system—and not in his pessimism, is to be found the second ground for his Quietism. Finally, thought is nothing for him but brain-product. Beyond consciousness there is no thought, no presentation. Even if we actually disregard the first two causes of Quietism, and we still wish to take

our share of the common work of life, how could we expect to produce with our brain the wisdom capable of showing us what is right; how could we hope, even if we had found the right path, to prevail upon the stupid masses to accompany us, and to warn them off the wrong road, if a wise Providence in the shape of instinct and a vague presentiment, does not enter their hearts to guide them to the ultimate goal? Schopenhauer's *Materialism*, his *denial of a Providence*, and not his pessimism, is then the third ground for his Quietism. If, however, we accept what Schopenhauer denies—an all-wise Providence leading the process of the world's development to the goal of a universal salvation—Quietism altogether disappears.

Pessimism as such can only be a source of Quietism for those above-mentioned mollusc-souls, who, out of sheer inertia and incapacity to engage in the easiest work, prefer to put their hands in their pockets and to suffer the pain, rather than stretch them forth in the direction clearly indicated, and gradually rid themselves of their discomfort. Anyone endowed with sufficient courage and manliness to boldly and unflinchingly face the pain of the

present and future, which he knows to be temporarily unavoidable, can be actuated by no stronger motive to the most active energy than the prospect of arriving by means of this activity at a state when pain will ultimately be overcome ; whereas the ceaselessness of pain is made certain by apathy. The prospect of a future pleasure is a weaker motive than that of a possible pain ; present pain is a far stronger motive than both.

Even the dullest of men, and the most stupid of animals, who can in no wise be moved by a promise of reward or pleasure, will be rudely roused from their obtuse sluggishness by the application of pain. In this case, the pain actually experienced works together with the outlook of a boundless future of pain to stir up activity. Certainly, the prospect of being released from pain is not immediate, but belongs to the dim future. Nevertheless, in the first place, the limited time that must elapse before salvation takes place is infinitely small compared to the endless duration of pain which looms large before the mind. Secondly, we do not speak here of animals, but of men endowed with reason, and capable of a rational

imaging of the future. Even the possibility of a future relief is not the real motive to conduct, but only a condition under which the true stimulus—the immediately imminent pain considered as infinite—may become a rational spring of action. We are certainly obliged to assume another premise also, namely, the consciousness of the solidarity of the pain and pleasure of all individuals. This solidarity makes itself unmistakably apparent as the social principle of the dawning century, just as free competition in the struggle for existence was and is the principle of bourgeoisie.

Once monism is admitted, egoism becomes theoretically untenable; the self-denial and positive surrender of the individual for the good of the whole are set up in its place. For, according to the monistic axioms, it is one and the same being living and feeling in me and you; so that your being is altered in exactly the same manner by my pain as by yours, except that you, as a conscious subject, are not conscious of the former. (What I have said here in respect to the second stage of the illusion does not apply to this only, as one critic would have it, but generally.) Solidarity is

the objective expression for the nature of morality, which subjectively (according to its positive and negative sides) can be described as love and self-denial (these are also cardinal points in Christian ethics). The source of all wrong-doing is selfishness, and it is the problem of ethics to make it harmless. In what way can the folly of selfishness be more strikingly demonstrated, or how can it be made easier for men to suppress their selfish desires than by pessimism, *i.e.*, by the proof of the vanity of all individual (material and transcendental) strivings after happiness? Once egoism has been thoroughly convinced of its stupidity by pessimism, and its inherent absurdity laid bare, no further obstacle stands in the way of the adoption by men of the only other possible method of release from the miseries of existence, namely, the voluntary surrender of the individual for the good of the whole. The pain urging to action, and the knowledge of the necessity of pledging one's whole person to the common weal, have now full opportunity of producing their effect on men. It is therefore evident that *pessimism* affords the *profoundest and truest basis of morality*, since it, more than

any other system, destroys the claims of egoism, and makes the road clear for the solidarity of the community. It certainly assumes two other conditions, namely, optimism rightly understood, and monism. For if monism be discredited, pessimism, it is true, can still secure the suppression of selfishness, but not the necessity of active love. This follows from monism. Again, the necessity of sharing in the work of the world's progress is based on the supposition of a wise Providence who, with hidden wisdom, guides the process to the best possible goal, and who particularly had previously arranged and adapted the "how and what" of the world to the best possible end, so that a release from the suffering of the irrational will should only be possible through the world process. I have, therefore, always stated that this optimism is the necessary and incontrovertible complement of pessimism. The pessimism of Schopenhauer is by itself as false and one-sided as the optimism of Leibnitz and Hegel; the truth lies not in the impossible, absolutely exact mean between the two, but in their combination. "This world is the best of all possible worlds, but it is worse than none at all."

It follows quite naturally that one who considers, not self-denial and positive self-surrender, but self-preservation and affirmation, *i.e.*, rational egoism, to be the *summum bonum* of practical philosophy or ethics, will also not relinquish the hope of a personal infinite existence, by means of which he can pursue his self-seeking into all eternity. Who is it, however, who screams loudest and most indefatigably for the preservation of his precious existence? Not the statesman whose deeds are inscribed in the rolls of history, but the philistine, on whose tomb-stone is written, "he was born, took a wife and died," and who is as like his brothers as one egg is like all others. Let a man only look around him. Most men who have really worked and suffered, who have reason to look back with satisfaction on their life's career, yearn for rest after their toil, for eternal sleep, in which they might return to the lap of Nature, the soul entrusted to them as a pledge. There are a few men who have had neither the opportunity, nor the capacity, of doing any regular work, and, therefore, have no right to be tired, and who are so stupefied by the jog-trot of their wretched commonplace

existence as never even to notice its misery. They are just the people who noisily protest against this well-earned fatigue as a treachery to God, and they never once have a presentiment of the sickening horror of individual immortality. Only a few centuries' life of the faculties and powers of a perpetual consciousness, and it must collapse under its burden. It is indeed peculiarly wonderful in the system of Nature that, just as it invigorates and refreshes the individual consciousness by the partial interruptions of sleep, it can in the same way only ensure the living continuity of *the historical consciousness of mankind*, and prevent it from slumbering, by producing partial interruptions through death, and restitution by new births. Everything, on account of its novelty, is interesting to childhood and youth, and these are *immortal*. It is only by such an artifice that life can be maintained. Let progress and development take place. They are of the greatest moment. But they are only possible in the world as a whole by the continual destruction of the identity of individuals. In one and the same person, its duration is necessarily limited to the utmost extent.

Whence, however, springs this ardent desire to assume individual immortality? Why does it appear painful to men to be deprived of it? The cause lies in nothing else than pure egoism, which fondly hopes to disguise its shamelessness under the cloak of a transcendent religionism. Since the philistine cannot be made to think that his beloved precious I—the only and highest thing in the world for which he has *a real and direct interest*,—can disappear, since he cannot allow this speculative phantom of his mind to lapse into nothingness, since, in other words, he cannot, with his short-sighted understanding, overcome the instinctive fear of death, he yearns after immortality, “he hopes for eternal perfection,” not on its own account, but only that his ego may be the subject of it. The more an individual fears the approach of death, the greater is his hope of immortality, when once conceived. The more indifferent a man is to death, the less does he care for a future existence. For the hero in the full bloom of youth immortality has no charms, but to old women it is the very life’s air they breathe. To the philosopher, recognising the nothingness of his being, and the phenomenality of his

conscious ego, it is nought but a falsely-established demand.

The philistine does not believe that his hope is a pure egoistic illusion, and seeks to justify the desire for an immortal life by rational arguments, which are themselves only subjective wishes. These are, for the most part, the postulate of a compensating *Justice*, and the hope of love to meet the beloved beyond the grave. Let us consider both these contentions more closely, *not* for the purpose of discussing the question of immortality, but merely to test the accuracy of the statement that immortality is a necessary postulate of the mind, without which life would be *comfortless*. When we shall have arrived at this point, that the question of immortality has been proved to have been *falsely* connected with certain postulates, then, and not till then, shall we have obtained for this problem the impartiality of theoretical investigation — an essential condition of all scientific success.

The sentiment of justice, the sense of right, the belief in a moral order of the world, feels itself outraged at the thought that sin and wickedness should go unpunished, that the

virtuous man, who, for virtue's sake, has suffered and surrendered so much on earth, should never be rewarded. It demands, on the ground of the undeniable inequality in the distribution of blessings, an equalising process in a future state, where happiness will be distributed, not by chance or caprice, but in accordance with *merit*. We must first clear up the confusion of the two standpoints, *the moral* and the *hedonistic*; the former requires *virtue to be rewarded and guilt punished*, the latter *the readjustment of the balance of suffering and good fortune*. Both have this in common: that their demands spring from the *sense of right*.

As regards the moral standpoint, we may at the outset remark that virtue which does not find its reward in itself is no virtue. If it derives its payment from itself, it *requires* no other; if it does not, it *deserves* none. (The prospect of reward and punishment can only produce an external legal righteousness, never real virtue; indeed, it injures this latter by undermining its disinterestedness.) It cannot be as generally laid down that guilt finds its punishment in itself, even if this is true,

directly or indirectly, in the vast majority of cases. There are many instances of sinners spending a snug, comfortable life, undisturbed by the pricks of conscience. If future reward is superfluous, and is not demanded by justice, future punishment only appears admissible in those cases, and in such a degree, where the inherent punishment of the consciousness of guilt is not proportional to the offence ; for the due proportion between guilt and punishment is an indispensable pillar of justice.

But even this shred of a future jurisdiction can only have a meaning if we assume that the future life is an almost unchanged continuation of the earthly existence. For only in the case of their possible shortcomings and faults tallying with those punishable on earth can punishment exercise a preventative and improving effective in respect to the future conduct of men beyond the grave. But if the future life (by the lapse of sensation, etc.) displays altogether new relations and conditions ; if it, in truth, commences an absolutely new existence, under entirely different circumstances, then the employment of an abstract retribution seems to be quite purposeless. Every person

who has suffered injury on earth would certainly be deemed inhuman and heartless should he, under such conditions, stand out for the punishment of his persecutor, so that we can scarcely expect from the hands of the Divine Judge the fulfilment of the Jewish doctrine, "measure for measure." If it is, moreover, quite clear that the whole conception of right, justice, and retribution is *false*, which bases the punishment on the acts *already done*, instead of those *about to be committed*, then the idea of a future jurisdiction, under the supposition of an altered state of life, is logically impossible. Finally, if we discard the view that individuals in this life are different in existence, and are substantially separated from each other, and if we assume instead that, in all alike, the one and the same being lives, feels, and acts, then it is the one being which, as offender, does a wrong action, and as offended against, suffers an injury, which incurs the guilt in the one, and endures the pain in the other. Only a *pluralistic* theory of the world, by *mistaking* the moral order of *this life*, finds itself compelled to *seek it in the future state*. Monism or pantheism, on the other hand, is satisfied

that moral right is universally and perfectly carried out on earth.

The other side of the demand, the readjustment of happiness, and the compensation for innocent suffering in the future, is equally unsound. In the first place, we have to note that happiness and misfortune are not nearly so unevenly distributed as a superficial observation, which takes account only of apparent good fortune, would lead us to imagine. For happiness and suffering are of the heart, and external blessings have an influence on them only in their acquisition, and not in their possession. As virtue can give an adequate return for the greatest privations, and the consciousness of guilt can embitter the highest enjoyment, both are thus inseparably united in actual life. The vividness of pleasure and pain depends more on the character than on outward conditions. The real, and by far the more significant inequality of distribution in this world's goods lies in the innate mental qualities of the sense of enjoyment, and not in the external relations (Euskoly) and the sense of misery (Dyskoly). It is, for all that, unquestionable, that the importance of the

changes of life (of good and bad fortune) is not by any means inconsiderable. Circumstances may very well arise sufficient to paralyse the elasticity of the most cheerful disposition. In respect to the *inner* factor of happiness and suffering, then, the innate character, its growth with the being of the individual, lies in its "innateness." Therefore, a readjustment of, and compensation for, the misery suffered on earth in consequence of temperament seems impossible, unless such an alteration of the character takes place in his being and person, that it undergoes *a new creation, with the interruption of his identity*. As for the *external* factor, I most strenuously deny that suffering (worthy of the name) can ever be compensated for. Conceive the case of the prudent father of a family, who, charged with an infamous crime, must remain for years in prison, till by chance his innocence is brought to light. All the rewards and crowns in the world could not repay him or his family for the overwhelming misery experienced. Pain, once endured, can never be compensated for. The past can never be made good. The utmost that can be done is to prevent *the consequences which have*

not yet followed in its track. The highest point then at which the so-called compensation can aim is the extinction of bitter memories ; when the suffering has been more than usually intense, even this is unattainable. All the delights of Paradise (apart from their importance in and for themselves, for the time being) can, in reference to the past, only achieve at the utmost that which can be *far more safely secured* by drinking of the fabled waters of Lethe. Since in the demand for immortality it is precisely the retrospective aspect of the future which is used as an argument, it is evident that the compensation sought for *is more certainly guaranteed by the cessation of thought* and the individual consciousness. If one abstracts oneself from the memory of the endured pain, then amends for the pain itself is not only impossible, but even if it were possible, it would be entirely *superfluous* ; for the past is absolutely *non-existent*. The only real thing is the present, in which the past and future are only ideally manifest by memory and expectation. If, then, *I withdraw* from my mind from this moment the vivid memories of all my past experiences, it is per-

fectly indifferent to me whether the reminiscences are pleasant or disagreeable ; and it is as if I had commenced to live from this minute, so that there is no further occasion for readjustment. For the only action possible to sensating subjects is the removal of the bitterness from the memories of an unpleasant past, an object best secured by interrupting the identity of the person. This, we have seen, is at any rate necessary for the inner factor. Compensation for the past pain itself is as superfluous as it is unfeasible. This in no way removes the reproach levelled by certain men at different times against the injustice of fate. On the contrary, the impossibility of making amends for the pain itself only confirms this charge. What shall we think of the wisdom of a Providence which troubles and tortures mankind on earth, as a set-off against future happiness? It is the same as feeding one on wormwood in the hope that he will at some time or other receive honey in its stead. I don't want any honey as long as I am not given gall ! How can we believe that Providence will bring about in the future a fair distribution of happiness, if in this world it offers such poor proof,

either of its capacity or of its good will? A *kind-hearted* God can only desire *the welfare* of His creatures, so that, if they are miserable it is the fault of His power, and not of His good will. As long as He cannot alter His power, they will remain wretched. The same phenomenon which was apparent in the treatment of the subject from the moral standpoint is repeated here. For a theory of the universe which considers individuals as separate and substantially different beings, must regard the apportionment of happiness and misery *in this world* as unjust and iniquitous. Those who hold this opinion dream of readjustment and retribution in *the future*, instead of recognising that the mistake lies in their own false metaphysical assumptions. A monist must ridicule complaints concerning the disproportionate and unfair allotment of pain among individuals, just as a physician would ridicule the cry of a patient that injustice has been done, because the teeth on the right side have to bear so much pain, whilst those on the left are perfectly sound. Compensation in the future must appear as absurd to the monist as the demand of the sufferer, that the left teeth

should have their share of pain after the resurrection.

As we have now removed the unfounded claims of the sense of right, arising from false suppositions, we come now to the second subjective wish, from which the problem of immortality derives its support, namely, to that of love. All love, deserving of the name, is compounded of two elements ; the one selfish, the other self-denying. Self-effacing love loves its object for its own sake, without wishing to derive any advantage, pleasure, or happiness from it. This love must shrink with horror from the idea of immortality, after it has once appreciated its fearfulness. Under any circumstances, it only desires the immortality of the beloved one out of love, and in order to ensure its happiness. It must, therefore, allow this wish to lapse as aimless, as soon as immortality does not appear desirable in respect to personal well-being. Self-seeking love is, in the first place, egoism, and the desires emanating from this principle of conduct are not only insignificant, from an ethical point of view, but are also in the highest degree suspicious. Secondly, the argument

moves in a vicious circle. For love can only hope for a future meeting with the beloved, *on the supposition* of a future life; and again, the necessity of an existence after death is derived from a wish to see one's beloved again. It is absolutely illusory to imagine that the decision concerning a future life is of any account to a lover whom death has robbed of his mate. Selfish love, buoying itself up with the delusion of again finding its companion, forgets that in the posthumous life, the beloved object will be stripped of all those properties which, depending on the lover's sense-perception, organic temperament, and character, inhere in individual differences. It forgets that at best nothing remains but an *abstract type*, and that the countless souls are as indistinguishable from each other as the pebbles on the seashore. At all events there is no ground left for *individual-preferring* love.

But these remarks seem useless if we penetrate further into the mystical nature of love, into that mysterious power which makes one interest oneself in the welfare of another as in one's own, and in the love which always, even when self-seeking, troubles for others, one is

enabled to find satisfaction and pleasure *for oneself*. The natural appearance of the world of consciousness is individualistic, monadological, and pluralistic; it is only the Unknown who considers His Being immediately as monistic. Into the chaos of consciousness love sheds a glimmering ray of the Eternal Truth of the All-comprehensive Being. The mind sees the enchanting vision, but it cannot accept as being, what contradicts its necessary illusion. It comprehends it, therefore, as something to be desired, to be longed for, and the fascinating foreboding of a universal oneness becomes a yearning for union. All love is in its deepest root yearning; all yearning is towards unity.

"Longing is the world's great secret,
All creation's growth and glow;
Towards everlasting concord
One eternal effort show.

"But the blending's constant shipwreck
Is the anguish of man's breast;
And the blending's fleetest fancy
Gives to love its only zest."

The mysterious root of love displays itself

most strikingly in sexual attachment, for in this case the connection does not remain a mere possibility, but is, at least, partially realised in the co-habitation of the lovers for the purpose of producing offspring ; and this is so even if the sexual act was not the outcome of mutual love. It often happens that lovers' aspirations after union are characterised by extreme bestiality. They may consume each other in the madness of their unbridled passion, but whatever happens, they have entered upon a state in which they have no care for their own self, but allow it to be completely absorbed in that of their beloved. He knows not love who has never felt the yearning for self-immolation in favor of the beloved object. If, therefore, love expects the realisation of its yearnings from the future, the attainment of its true aim (in which, of course, it no longer exists as striving), then the continuation of the individual after death is altogether opposed to the nature of true love ; for in that case the pain of an impossible wish becomes perpetuated. The only goal to which love can aspire is the real and lasting union, whose transient dream was its highest pleasure on

earth, the suppression of the individual, but not for another (which really the other does not desire), but, in common with him or her, in the highest and purest love of consciousness, in God. Philosophically expressed, it stands thus: the removal of that illusion originating in the mind, the plurality of individuals; in other words, the removal of mind itself.

Is this doctrine then so comfortless, or is it not rather a comforting, soothing, and flattering thought to find in monism the deepest satisfaction of the noblest aspirations of mankind? If everything high and good consists in this, "not to be self-seeking," then there is nothing small before the highest tribunal except egoism, which, even in its most refined form, can only be a means (as a motive to occupation and work) and never an end in itself. Is it then justifiable to defame a doctrine as comfortless, because it has the courage to lay bare in its littleness what the philistine considers the greatest good, and to show that its opposite is the noblest object worth striving for? Is it then cruel to dissipate illusions, whose foundations are laid in the shifting sands of egoism, or should we confirm them still

further in their harmful durability? Yes, I am told, even if we abandon everything egoistic, even if we give up all striving after personal gratification (here as well as hereafter), even if we grant also that the hoping for, and the attainment of, real happiness in the course of earthly development is blameworthy in man, yet we cannot allow ourselves to be altogether deprived of the hope of the possibility of positive pleasure. It is mainly because your doctrine enunciates its purely negative character that we condemn it as absolutely comfortless. But even this position is unsound. Is the prospect I hold out an evil? No, for you must admit that non-existence is no evil. And if it is true that present existence is undesirable, and the prospect not an evil, then I am giving you comfort. I console you for existence, with the hope of so-called non-existence. It is existence which requires comfort; non-existence can do without it. As existing beings in want of consolation, my system offers you it. You cannot, therefore, call it comfortless. As non-existing entities you will certainly not find it hopeless. How can you say then, that it lacks consolation?

You do not wish to abandon altogether the idea of positive happiness! Why not? Because your will is hungry, and panting for pleasure? To whom do you prefer your demand for happiness? What is the foundation for it? *Have you then any right to happiness?* No, you have none, as little as you are obliged to suffer pain and anguish complacently. If you have no right to happiness, why do you frantically rave for it, and scream out in agony when your illusions are destroyed? You desire happiness because you want it; as long as you have will, you will be wishing for happiness, you will be seeking for the satisfaction of your will. And you do not understand that the irrational will, by so doing, makes a fool of your reason; you do not see that it belongs as much to the nature of will to grope for the phantom of happiness, as to possess the reality of pain. You will not give up the unreasonable illusion which your will places in a false light, and you grumble at the want of comfort of a doctrine which points the way to absolute happiness, because the will ruling you rears up at the idea of resignation. Or will you make the unfortunate philosophers answerable for

being placed in a world which offers you such sad alternatives? I, however, do certainly not think this world is so constituted, that one can only live in it either by indulging in unrefuted illusions, or by a full and complete resignation. Or is it a fault of the inquirer after truth, that the facts discovered by him shatter your illusions? Why do you tolerate philosophical writings if it is more pleasurable for you to leave your illusions undisturbed, and, like the hunted ostrich to hide your head from the unpleasant knowledge of the truth? If you have once been entangled in your illusions, then nothing better can be done than to earnestly exhort you to advance to a complete resignation.

No, I am told, we shall even abandon the pleasure of will satisfaction. Still beyond the process of the world, in the All-Comprehensive Being there must at least be an intellectual unsensual happiness, which is positive and more than a mere return into a purely unconscious potentiality.

How then, I ask, is this happiness to be understood? Is it anything but the eternal meditations of God over His own inexhaustible.

goodness and sanctity, or over the misery of the destroyed world? But no, God does not reflect; He lives in an intellectual self-intuition, comprehending everything in one eternal glance. As for me, I don't see what amusement can be gained by it. The poor monk to whom a hundred years of contemplation of God seem as one hour, might be enraptured by such a proceeding, because it is so much above his reach. But it is difficult to believe that God Himself, who has had considerable opportunities of knowing Himself, would not ultimately weary of an eternal self-contemplation. If this intuition is interesting, then the will is interested in it, and accordingly it can just as well tire of it. It can, therefore, produce satiety, as well as happiness. But if it is absolutely uninteresting, then its existence or non-existence is a matter of no consequence, *i.e.*, its existence is not worth more than its non-existence, and happiness is of no account.

Turn it how we please, a yearning after positive happiness on the basis of will is an illusion full of contradictions, and without this groundwork it lacks every tenable foundation. Either a paradise with Houris or Nirvana!



OUR RELATION TO ANIMALS.

ANIMALS are of the same race as ourselves, even if they are not of the same class. They are our cousins of an older generation, by which figure I mean that there is a real relationship between us. They are similarly constituted to ourselves, and their natural life is composed of the same functions as our own. Even their mind displays the same elementary faculties—knowing, willing, and feeling—the same conflict between selfish and altruistic instincts, and the same psychical conditions for gesture and language. This latter fact is proved by the relative power of the superior brutes of comprehending human speech, and the capacity of a few of them for imitating words that are by no means unintelligible. The difference between man and brute is one of degree only. All mammals (except man) are, it is true, dumb, and they are therefore in

their psychical life to be compared only with mutes. But it is only an apparent difference of kind. A dumb man who has not been skilfully and laboriously educated to an understanding and use of written language finds himself, like the animal, limited to inarticulate speech and gesture. His thinking is always more concrete than that of his fellow-men endowed with language, and who have reached the same pitch of education as himself. It is not wanting in ideas, although it cannot define them by words. It can make logical deductions from particular and general presentations, as rationally as can that of the speaking man.

In the same sense we can deny the concrete mental life of animals neither ideas nor the logical sequence of presentations, *i.e.*, adequate thinking; so that one looks here in vain for a sharp line of demarcation between man and beast. Since, however, human beings have gradually fashioned a verbal language, and have bequeathed a developed sense of speech to their descendants, dumb men are more capable of education than animals, with which latter they are otherwise on an

equality, whilst the idiot is considerably inferior to the normal brute.

It is therefore undeniable that we stand in a moral relation to animals. The ethical duty "to injure none, but rather to help everybody to the best of our ability," applies to all sentient beings without exception, whether we regard them as fellow-creatures of the same Almighty, as children of the same Father in Heaven, as natural cousins of an older generation, or as objective manifestations of the same world-being. The ethical bond between the human and animal species exists independently of the fact, whether the particular brute has a more or less perfect, or even a totally inadequate comprehension of this connection.

- Indeed, that would be a wretched system of morality which is dependent on the mutual beneficence of its adherents, who give merely in the hope of having something equally good returned them. This in no way weakens the fact that the moral nexus is strengthened and is of richer content when both parties enter into a hearty agreement, or an implicit understanding, to render good for good. For, in that case, the simple sin of injury becomes com-

plicated with unfaithfulness, ingratitude, and injustice. This is also the case even when animals are unconscious of their helping man by their compulsory obedience. It is sufficient that man accepts, and in a measure enforces, this service, to consider himself morally bound to render correspondingly fair payment in return.

The brute is therefore a subject of moral rights, the subject of those moral rights corresponding to the duties of man towards it, and a violation of which constitutes a moral wrong. On the other hand, man's moral claims upon the animal end where its intellectual capacity fails to grasp the ethical relationship between itself and man. The latter has, however, the moral privilege of compelling the animal to work for him.

All systems of law have hitherto admitted as juridical subjects of rights only human individuals or human aims fixed by statute. There seems to be no intelligible reason why animals should not also be included as subjects of rights, seeing that idiots come under this category. Still it betokens a want of appreciation of the difference between moral

and legal rights and duties, to hold that in justice (from the point of view of an innate law of Nature and Reason) animals should be treated as subjects of rights in law. Legal right is always positive, *i.e.*, historical ; and, from its very nature, can only comprehend one part of the sphere of moral right. The exact portions of the domain of moral right to be incorporated by the legislature in a system of jural or positive rights can never depend on juridical considerations, but must be conditioned by their expediency and opportuneness.

But we must certainly deny that there is any urgent necessity, on the grounds of usefulness, for the investing of animals by the legislature with legal rights. Above all, the position of animals would in no wise be affected by any reform in that direction ; for their claims could never be insisted upon except through the representation of human beings, as is necessarily the case now, when, for example, an old lady sets aside a sum as a pension for her pet dog. The government might make the following salutary change in the laws concerning animals. It might ordain that the cruel or barbarous treatment of animals should be made punishable,

not only when it is done publicly, but also when it is proved to have been practised secretly, or in the presence of acquiescent spectators. This reform has nothing to do with the elevation of animals to the plane of legal rights. For the common danger of a character manifesting itself in such acts of savagery is sufficient in this case, as well as in respect to an injury against a person not endowed with legal privileges, to remind the State of its duty of protecting society, by timely attack upon such harmful developments of character.

Our legal relationship to animals is therefore of an indirect nature. Our system of law takes account of the moral relations of mankind to animals only as they affect the interests of human society, for whose preservation and protection alone has law been established. It is accordingly incorrect to consider our legal transactions with animals as direct, because our moral connection is such. It is equally wrong to doubt or to dispute the immediateness of the latter, because the former is only mediate. We do not refrain from injuring animals, because such a proceeding would be derogatory to our dignity, or because it hinders our virtuous as-

pirations to self-perfection, or because it would otherwise re-act unfavorably on the agent, and on human society in general, but pre-eminently because we are bound to respect the moral right of every percipient being without regard to position, or person, or even to race, species, or kind. This care for all living and feeling fellow-creatures, whether it be based on obedience to the will of the Creator, or on the real identity of the various individual phenomena, is simply a demand of (moral) justice; for in the last instance "justice" requires the "equality of all sensating subjects."¹ Just as the moral relations of men to each other rest, above all, upon a basis of moral justice, so do also those between man and brute.

It is only from this rationalistic moral principle that we can derive a clearly and sharply defined line of conduct, and not from the fluctuating principles of an emotional morality. These latter are indispensable, partly to strengthen the will to act justly, and partly to promote positive beneficence within the space left by justice. But, left to themselves, they

¹ Cp. my "Phän. d. Sitt. Bewusst," pp. 516-8. 2nd edition, pp. 415-8.

unquestionably form the most powerful incentives to evil and unfair conduct, and it is altogether impossible to deduce justice from one single sentimental moral principle (*e.g.*, sympathy), or from the sum-total of them all. Anyone basing his conduct to animals on justice will not in any case—whether he be sympathetic or not—act in any way wrongly to them; if his sympathy endorses his reason, it is nothing but a useless appendage. But he who is ruled by sympathy, by good nature and soft-heartedness, will find that his conduct only occasionally and casually tallies with the demands of justice, and often enough violates them. When the tender-hearted animal-lover sees a poor family breathlessly pulling and pushing a heavily-laden waggon, he always feels inclined to side with the overworked dog harnessed to it, and to overburden the human beings still further in favor of the animal. He forgets that the kindly-treated family dog considers it a right and a privilege to afflict himself with his masters, and that men, though they seem to be acting voluntarily, often suffer much more severely under the stinging lash of a relentless fate, and are much more dreadfully used by

this cruel compulsion, than the animal who is forced into the service of man. As long as men earn their bread with the sweat of their brow, and must occasionally overwork themselves, it would be an act of injustice to prevent them, at times, overloading their animals. To overburden animals without sufficient cause is equally unjust and unreasonable, and stands condemned apart from sympathy.

It is well known that sympathy is a two-edged sword. As a feeling of uneasiness, it compels one to avoid the sight of anything likely to produce it, and to remedy the causes when we cannot escape them. As a feeling whose conditions we seek to bring about, it is pleasurable, and as such, we are inclined not only not to remove the sympathised sufferings, but actually to bring them into existence. The pleasure of sympathy is closely allied to the pleasure of cruelty, and it is quite a mistake to imagine that persons addicted to poisoning and torturing animals have no fellow-feeling with their victims, for without a strong sense of sympathy they could not extract such a powerful pleasure from the pain of another. It is absurd, then, to endeavor to wean the pas-

sionate animal torturer from his savagely depraved practices by awakening his sympathetic sentiment. Success in this direction can only be achieved by compelling such a person to imagine himself subjected to the same barbarous treatment, and, by this means, to revive his sense of justice. For everyone perceives that to be hurt by another is a grievous wrong, so that it only requires an abstraction from the personality of the injurer and the injured to enable one to recognise that it is equally wrong to cause pain in others.

On the other hand, sympathy with animals oversteps the mark, as it does not take into consideration whether we are at war or at peace with them. As a matter of fact, man is opposed to all animals, against whom he has to defend himself in the struggle for existence. He can only enter into peaceful relations with those who are either their allies in their conflict with other animals, or are, at least, neutral.

The religion of sympathy—Buddhism—requires that one should calmly allow oneself to be devoured by tigers, stung by snakes and scorpions, and irritated by vermin, if there is

no means of removing them pacifically. It stamps the destruction of any of these animals as a capital offence, through which all claims to holiness, otherwise obtained, are given up. The absurdity of this conclusion demonstrates the untenability of the principle from which it has been deduced.

The struggle for existence is not less a war to the knife where it is indirect, where the animal is a competitor for the means of subsistence. It is therefore a matter of life or death for mankind to utterly annihilate the wild beasts of the field and the parasites of the house (mice, rats, ants, etc.). Every morsel of nourishment used up in strengthening an animal worsens the position of those human beings who dwell on the borderland of starvation. Every act of sympathy sacrifices a man to save an animal, even if the victim cannot be pointed out. From this point of view, it is an injustice to mankind to indulge in the sustenance of superfluous animals with nourishment which might have proved helpful to human beings, no matter whether the good in question be of direct or indirect service, *i.e.*, for the subsistence of useful animals. Those animals

are not to be considered as useless who are kept solely for instruction (in the Zoological Gardens), or for the pleasures of companionship (pet dogs, cats, and birds). Still less so, those assisting men in the chase, in their campaign against the parasitic class, in guarding their property, in moving from place to place, or in any other work; or those bred for the production of food and clothes. But even such animals should be so limited in increase that their number should not outgrow the quantity necessary for the use of man, for any superfluity would mean the needless absorption of the means of subsistence.

The strife against noxious and useless beasts, as well as that against the harmful multiplication of relatively useful animals, is a duty we owe to humanity. Since man has to solve higher moral problems and to strive after higher culture than the brute, preference must be given to the duty to humanity over that to animals. The sympathetic soft-heartedness which cannot, in certain cases, decide on the destruction of our four-footed fellow-creatures, is as immoral as the tenderness of a father who deprives his own children of bread in

order to give it to the idle and loafing tramp who begs at his door; or the feeling of an old maid who fattens her plump pug on roasts and pastry, whilst her servants have to be content with soup-meat and black bread.

Every face in Nature's household requires a regulator to prevent its excessive increase. One of the most important of these regulators is man; and his duties in this respect in the scheme of Nature become more extensive and more urgent as he gradually annihilates the other exterminators, *i.e.*, the beasts of prey. Man, in civilised lands, has now constituted himself the sole ruler of the majority of vegetarian and omnivorous animals. Therefore he violates not only his duty to humanity, but also his duty to maintain the symmetrical arrangement of Nature's household and the continuance of its equilibrium, by neglecting to discharge the functions of his office through misguided sympathy. Where there is a lack of regulating beasts of prey, such sentimentality would practically lead to absurdity, as is proved by the case of the frogs of Abdera,¹ or

¹*Translator's Note.*—Abdera, in Thrace, was once a most flourishing and famous town. It was the birth-place of

the forty-nine cats with which the good-natured young poet found himself blessed a year after he had interdicted the destruction of the first brood. Sentiment towards animals may thus lead to ridiculous results, especially when its absurd consequences are obvious, and its indirect injury and immorality of principle are absent from consciousness (for the seriousness of the latter is likely to destroy the humorous effect of the former).

From an ethical point of view, sentimental soft-heartedness is a highly dangerous quality,¹ and we must not be surprised to find its harmfulness confirmed when it influences our dealings with the animal race. We do occasionally meet with people distinguished by an overwhelming regard and an ostentatious tenderness for animals. They lay themselves open to the suspicion that they have very little feeling left for their fellow-men, and that they desire by excessive kindness and beneficence to animals to weaken the adverse conclusions many celebrated philosophers, among others Protagoras and Democritus. It afterwards lost its prestige, and became a bye-word for dulness and stupidity.

¹ Cp. the ch. "Das Moralprincip des Mitgeföhls" in my "Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusst," pp. 217-240.

which have been drawn from their neglect of duties to humanity. Very often it is the instinctive striving after a readjustment of the moral balance which compels men, who feel themselves wanting in the sentiment of justice, to give undue importance to their "good heart." Sometimes it is the natural absence of love which prompts one to indulge in an inordinate exercise of sympathy and tenderness to compensate for this vaguely felt want. More often than not it is precisely misanthropy and a neglect of their own race, which lead some people to a powerful concentration of all their available stock of feeling in the direction of the animal world. The sour-minded old maid, the embittered misanthropist, the sovereign who despises his subjects, the coldly-cruel inquisitor, the blood-thirsty revolution leader—these are the types in which over-regard for animals usually reaches its climax.

Any person regulating his relationship to animals on the basis of justice will never forget the inferiority of the brute should he enter into a close companionship with any particular member of the race. Such a man alone can bestow upon the animal the greatest boon in

the power of man to give—education ; whilst “the good heart” succeeds only in mis-training, *i.e.*, destroying it. A person who does not feel himself particularly drawn to the animal kind, and is therefore merely content to do it no harm, might yet prove himself the gentlest and noblest member of society. On the other hand, we should eye anyone with distrust who develops a superfluous sentimentality for animals, as we should a person who injures us for his own pleasure.

It is certainly possible that bitter experiences and an undeserved ill-fortune, may drive a man to solitude ; and we should not grudge his deserted soul a last refuge in the animal world. But, generally speaking, to isolate oneself cheerfully from one's fellowmen is to culpably neglect the claims which human society is justified in exacting from all its members.

The foregoing remarks are sufficient to prove that sympathy is not a necessary principle of conduct in our relations to animals. We should rather look for this principle to justice which, while fully admitting the rights of animals, does not forget those of men also, and which recognises the duties to Mankind and to Nature, as of

greater moment than those to animals. All of us, therefore, without exception, are not only justified, but are also morally compelled to side with man in his struggle for existence with the animal, and consequently to destroy the noxious and needless competitors for the necessities of earthly existence. At the same time we should avoid all superfluous cruelty and barbarity in this conflict. This especially applies to our using animals for the promotion of human ends, both as regards the employment of animal labor, and also the advancement of science and medicine by means of experiment.

Modern natural science has attained to the rank of exact knowledge really because of the experimental foundations of its method. It cannot give up experiment without losing its place as exact science. Experiments in physiological and pathological processes can only be conducted on living bodies, and every physician is obliged to practise constantly on his patients. Every new remedy, every new poison, every freshly discovered chemical, must be tested on animate objects for its physiological effects. Every original, bold, surgical operation must be performed once, and for the first time, on a

living organism. The inquiry concerning the origins of illness, and especially its organic conditions, can only be advanced through inoculatory experiments on those free from the disease. The discovery of the functions of the different portions of the central nerve system can only be promoted by an interference with the normal processes of life. Often enough has a fanatic enthusiasm for the progress of science induced young physicians to subject themselves to such experiments, terminating fatally in many cases. Lythotomy we owe to a French physician, who obtained permission from the king to take a convict, condemned to death and suffering from stone, as a subject of the first experiment. Such physiological experiments may be performed without causing much or any inconvenience at all to their objects (as many food-experiments). They may also be very painful without interfering in any way with the work of the organism; *e.g.*, the protracted confinement under a narrow glass bell for the purposes of determining the nature of the exhaled gas. Finally, they may lead to severe sickness, and to more or less certain death (as the inoculation experiments with

microbes, or the experiments with poison). Anyone acquainted with modern physiology, pathology, and medicine, knows full well that the future of these sciences depends on the rational manipulation of such experiments, which must also be conducted on a very extensive scale. An opponent of this view will find himself at variance with the overwhelming majority of the representative members of those sciences. Even if the rival theory that all animal experiments are superfluous and unessential were correct, and even if the legislative consequences of this theory were carried out,—if vivisection were prohibited—it would be absolutely futile. The inquirer, who is often sufficiently courageous to subject himself to daring experiments, would practise vivisection at home the more zealously, as he finds himself likely to undergo martyrdom for the glory of science, at the hands of an unreasonable legislature.

Instead of annulling the old proposition in respect to animals, "*fiat experimentum in corpore vili*," it would perhaps be wiser to earnestly consider the desirability of utilising convicts as "*corpora vilia*," *i.e.*, of setting free a

person condemned to death, on condition that he submits himself to a possibly fatal experiment. Those sentenced to a lighter form of punishment should be released on undertaking to suffer a more or less painful operation.

Science and prison administration would both derive an equal advantage from such a proceeding ; justice and the public would suffer no damage, whilst nothing would happen to the convicts themselves against their consent. Such a law, with one blow, would take all the force out of the sentimental complaints concerning the unjust treatment of animals by natural philosophers, inasmuch as it would classify experiments on animals and on men together. For if nothing should be done to an animal without first obtaining its consent, then we ought not to kill it, or to employ it in labor, against its will.

That no legislature can prevent abuses is as clear as that a thing is exposed to misuse in proportion as it is noble and important. The best and most effectual remedy for the abusive treatment of animal experiments lies in a careful education of students in their expedient and technical arrangement, in their advantage-

ousness, and in their limitations. The legal interdiction in respect to vivisection at lectures has just the opposite effect, — it introduces irrational and unskilled blundering into this domain. The significant question as to whether the ultimate use of certain experiments is sufficiently weighty to justify the pain suffered by the animal lies, of course, quite beyond the pale of legal or judicial interference, and can only be answered by a competent authority. It must finally be referred to the tact and knowledge of the most authoritative representatives of the profession. Public opinion should, by its voice, sharpen the knowledge of inquirers, and refine their tact.

It cannot, however, adequately perform this duty, if it acts without judgment, and compels the investigator, through its misunderstanding, not to trouble himself in the slightest about satisfying a public opinion not amenable to argument. The very term which describes the animal experiment is utilised by anti-vivisectionists to stir up the horror which most men experience at the sight of the surgical knife and the flowing blood. As a matter of fact, only a very small portion of experiments re-

quire surgical operation, and even these need not be particularly painful. Speaking generally, such are not the experiments which are accompanied with the greatest suffering to their subjects.

THE NEED OF BOOKS.

THE most important factor in the advance of scientific education is scientific literature, just as the most important factor in its preservation is the scientific training of the higher schools and universities. Germany owes its proud position of scientific pre-eminence among the nations to the scope and excellence of its scientific literature, as well as to the soundness of its schools and colleges. Since the yearly production of books in Germany exceeds those of France and England taken together, it is only to be expected that a greater number of prominent works would be found in the German market than in the French or English. As for the other nations, they are of even smaller account in the sphere of science. In more modern times, certain phenomena have appeared which are likely to interfere with the prosperous development of scientific literature

in Germany. This danger is weighty enough to justify our devoting some attention to its causes, and the means of obviating it.

The sale of really valuable scientific works, which are not text-books or cheap popular editions, is becoming more and more limited, so as to cover scarcely a third of the expenses of production. Consequently, the difficulty experienced by authors to obtain a publisher becomes more and more intense. In France and England, lovers of literature are usually rich enough to buy the books they wish to read. In Germany, the average of general prosperity is much lower ; and even those who are wealthy are not over-anxious to purchase good books. But this difference between Germany and other countries, in the purchasing power of the nation and of the literary classes, has always existed, and yet it did not, in the past, prevent a certain development of scientific literature. But now, with the advance in the well-being of the people, their inclination to buy scientific and literary works is becoming less and less. The publishers are bound to take notice of these circumstances. It is not right, therefore, on the part of writers, to cry

out against the publishers, who are, after all, only men of business.

I consider the following to be the reasons for the decrease in the purchase of scientific and good literature.

1. The diminution of the leisure time of the educated, and of their power to spend this time earnestly and with application, brings into favor a recreative and entertaining form of literature, while it prejudices such literature, the reading of which requires steadiness and concentration.

2. Our interest in politics weakens our interest in science and art, etc. ; moreover, the disturbing and wearing restlessness of modern town life (in employment and society) make application more and more difficult.

3. The appreciation of rent in towns, and the growing frequency of removals, make the greater possession of books an increasing burden which a German shrinks from undertaking. For (as in England) it is the private house which enables one to keep a library for oneself.

4. The high price of books, resulting from the rise in the wages of the compositors, is

considerably in advance of the depreciation of gold, and therefore adds to the disinclination to buy new works. Publishers receive too small a portion of the price paid by the public—the middleman taking the lion's share of the profits.

5. One is obliged to keep a certain number of books for appearance' sake. This object is attained, however, by cheap editions of classical works, encyclopaedic and reference books, popular science works issued in shilling libraries, fashionable novels, occasional presents, and indispensable helps to a person's employment. Most of the room available in the dwelling is exhausted by these.

6. The leisure time for reading, through the striving to keep up with the current literature necessary to one's own occupation, is, for the most part, entirely filled up by a newspaper, periodical, or the latest novel. No time or desire, accordingly, remains for the reading of original scientific works.

7. The habit of reading daily papers and magazines destroys the taste and capacity for reading books which require sustained attention. Indeed, the time is not far distant, when

the leading article will require too close an attention, and will be concentrated into a mosaic of leaderettes.

We can no more prevent the curtailment of leisure time due to the increasing demands of employment, than we can weaken the prevailing interest in politics. We can only hope that young men should spend their time in acquiring a general scientific education before the full force of their powers is required by their occupation, and should postpone any participation in political matters till they have reached a certain degree of culture (about their 30th year). A considerable time will elapse before the wretched state of town dwellings is remedied by legal interference with building speculation. Till then, a lavish endowment of imperial and municipal libraries must come to the assistance of both the public and the publishers. The authorities must be alive to the fact that such an endowment is eminently justifiable for the preservation and promotion of national scientific literature. As the publication of novels lives mainly by means of the lending library, in the same way scientific publications might derive their support from scientific libraries; if only

the means were forthcoming to further the culture of the nation by buying and lending books. Publishers should sell their books net to all public libraries; for the profit of the middleman is altogether unnecessary here. On the other hand, they should not be compelled to give a free copy to every library.

The public should also have the opportunity of trading directly with the publishers, and if the distributor (bookseller) is not put to any trouble, purchasers might save the expenses of distribution. This can be made practicable by the formation of a literature society, entered on the trade register as a bookselling agency. The only commission chargeable to members would be the actual expenses involved. It would indeed be of more radical assistance if the post would undertake the despatch of books, as it does that of newspapers, and issue at a moderate subscription a book catalogue as it does a paper catalogue, and establish a central book-office for answering questions, and the completion of imperfect orders. The sending of books on approval for a certain time would be possible by depositing the price as security; the only thing abolished would be the sending

of unasked-for books as a speculation. This practice I consider to be overwhelmingly harmful on account of its distracting influence. In my opinion, the destruction of the credit system, which would inevitably follow the establishment of a State book-shop, would be of the greatest advantage to the book trade. As little as the district and municipal banks are affected by the Post Office Bank, the book trade would suffer by a Post Office book business. But a limitation of the number of booksellers, which, since there has been free competition, has far exceeded the demand, can only be profitable to the book-agents. The antiquarian business would alone ensure the establishment of independent book-shops; still more so, the desire of many purchasers for personal conversation and oral information, and also the wish to have the books sent on approval, recommended by a third party.

Such buyers will always be ready to give the bookseller his percentage for his trouble. Should the Post Office by its advantages make up for the depreciation of the existing book trade, its benefits should be felt by the public and not by the Post Office. It should only

receive the net price of the books from customers, without any profit, and should be satisfied with the postage for the order (3 Pennigs), the price of the wrapper for the books sent, and an ultimate fee for the distribution of information. Such a system would enable the author of means to become his own publisher, whilst at present half of the money paid by the public for his works is swallowed up by the booksellers and publishers' agents. For the needy author a society must be formed which will subject the manuscripts sent in to an honorary examination, and publish at its own cost those deemed worthy of publication. The expenses would be covered partly by the contributions of members—who would receive in exchange the society's publications—partly by the sale to libraries and the public through the booksellers. It would be very desirable to solve this technical problem : namely, to discover a method of issuing smaller editions, say 100 to 500 copies, which should be cheaper than the letter press and at the same time present the usual appearance of small and large type.

The danger existing in the stifling influence

of the papers and journals must be attacked in a double way. Young men must be made to understand that, in yielding to the fleeting fascination of this class of literature, they are selling their souls, they are giving up inestimable opportunities for mental training. Older men must also cease to conveniently invest periodical literature with unmerited value. They should look upon it as an evil, and should treat the daily press with the neglect it deserves, so that young men should not be led by the power of example to fritter away their valuable leisure time in such aimless fashion. The educated youth under the age of 30 should devote as little time to reading papers as to politics, but should employ every hour at their disposal with useful and edifying books. The snow of yesterday is not more unsubstantial than the contents of yesterday's newspaper.

They should also not read magazines, for these only aim at keeping persons of a certain plane of education abreast with current thought. They are of no use to the insufficiently trained. They are the less harmful the more connected and richer their subject-matter is, that is, the greater resemblance they bear to books. They

are more injurious the nearer they approach to the character of the daily paper.

Men of maturer years should have sufficient insight to boycott the "large" daily papers and patronise the "small" ones. This patronage should be the more decided the less these papers air the views of a particular party, and the more anxious they are to narrate the important events of the day, and to comment on them with non-partisan brevity. As for magazines, only those should be taken into the house, which are necessary to keep the members abreast with current thought, and more especially to give them the most important facts of literature.

For all that, the busiest and hardest-worked of men should not neglect at holiday time to investigate the sources from which the spirit of national culture is being constantly refreshed, namely, the original works of thinkers, inquirers, and poets.

THE MODERN LUST FOR FAME.

Action is everything, fame is nothing.—*Goethe.*

DEAR READER,—

I sincerely hope you are not famous, but perhaps you desire to win fame, and if you are too old to wish for it yourself, perchance you would like your sons to be famous, and your grandsons and sons-in-law. Dear reader, be warned in time. There are a good many things in this world which men strive after. They don't perceive the dark side till they have succeeded. Fame is the worst of these frauds, for its dark sides are least known or observed. Allow me then to give you a few of them. When you read these lines, your self-contentment will be increased if you learn from them to thank God that you are not famous.

Very few heads, indeed, can endure the intoxicating fumes of fame's fiery incense and remain unclouded. They soon lose the,

balance of a rational judgment. Lovable modesty disappears, and is replaced by empty vanity. In the case of persons already vain, there is considerable danger of madness. A man becomes irritable if the recognition is withheld from him, to which he thinks he has acquired a right, by being famous. He grows presumptuous, and arrogates to himself the tribute of a just admiration. He now believes himself to be too high for his accustomed circle of family and friends, and elevated to a higher plane of existence. Since he now considers himself a nobler and better man than his former friends, he is no longer agreeable. He grows priggish and ambitious, and becomes, therefore, unlovable. In this way, not only morals and manners, but mind and character are also affected. The most intimate relations are poisoned. His dearest friends view with dismay the alteration made in his character by fame. His relatives are sorely grieved. Old friends draw back half-way, even if they take pleasure in his success. They fall away entirely should they view his triumph with grudging and jealous eyes.

There are a few rare exceptional natures who

have a clear and certain conception of themselves, their power, and the value of their achievements, and are accustomed to treat the judgment of the crowd with disdain. Only such can pass unscathed through the trying ordeal of fame. But how can they expect that the world will believe in such an exceptional temperament? The nearest friends and relatives may hold this belief and see it confirmed by daily experience. But envious acquaintances will be very little inclined to add such human merit to the fame they already grudge. More remote or new friends are bound to be prejudiced. They will certainly believe that the ordinary and almost inevitable faults of fame are present in this case also, and have only been somewhat more skilfully concealed than usual. Fame thus, deservedly or undeservedly, deadens with its chill blast all pure human relations.

The famous man is avoided and shunned by modest, retiring, sensitive, inoffensive and self-contented persons. He is sought after by immodest, obtrusive and frivolous people, who like to boast of their famous acquaintances. If, under ordinary circumstances, it requires a deal of care to unearth a "man," a famous man must

experience ten times the trouble in finding one. It is therefore more difficult for him to keep off those people, who cannot have the smallest possible interest for him. Men can with difficulty imagine that one who has merited fame can still be a man, and in a higher degree than others one to whom nothing human is strange, and in whom, therefore, all human interests are bound to find a sympathetic echo. Instead of this, modest and sensitive men, when brought into contact with a famous personage, frequently re-double their unobtrusiveness and reticence out of fear that they are not sufficiently intellectual or important, or that they are not adequately versed in his special subject. But others plague him with idiotic questions and remarks, through which they fondly hope to show their unusual interest in, and understanding of, his speciality. In town, as well as at fashionable watering-places, the famous man, if he is not a vain fool, will have the one wish to save himself by an incognito from the chilling and isolating cloud of fame. This means is, however, very seldom applicable, and at anyrate, it is of no assistance against the bores who invade his house. Thither come the curiosity mongers, who de-

part satisfied if they have assured themselves that Mr. X. is like his portrait.

But those persons whose acquaintance is really most desirable and of priceless value to both parties, very often dare not, unfortunately, step over the threshold of his house—through modesty—whilst he is badgered by real or alleged members of his class for purposes of charity, support, advice, and assistance. This is not by any means an unmitigated evil, for it does happen, though rarely, that the most purposeless pestering offers an opportunity of making himself useful. The most idiotic of all bores is the autograph-collector, who, not satisfied with facsimile autographs in his album, yearns to possess as many original signatures as possible. If, out of fear of being disagreeable, he has occasionally given way to such requests, he is overburdened with similar demands. But if he throws all such autograph-seeking letters (with the exception of those destined for a beneficent purpose) into the waste-paper basket—the only right way of dealing with them—he is exposed to all manner of subterfuges. One method is the fictitious charitable supplication. Another,

more favored still, is the appeal for counsel immediately before alleged contemplated suicide. The autograph-collector does not shrink from avowing himself an enthusiastic admirer of the person whose signature he seeks, even if his knowledge of him is confined to mere hearsay. Seldom do we find among them one who thinks it worth his while to make a more exact, indeed, a more easily acquired acquaintance with the best that a person can give, namely, with the series of his deeds or works.

A famous man must be very careful with his letters. The disgusting person-worship of this century, which is generally in inverse proportion to the earnestness and profundity of the real interest, has resulted in no private communication of a famous man being safe against posthumous publication. Nay, his letters are sometimes printed while he is yet alive. A vain person might be induced thereby to compose his private letters with an eye to future publication. But one to whom such an exposure of his private habits is extremely loathsome will limit his correspondence to the driest and most necessary facts, and will

bitterly resent the encroachment on the domain of private companionship, which should be held sacred.

In so far as the acts and works of a man follow certain fixed tendencies (artists should be the only exception), their views and aims are always exposed to the error and misinterpretation of their opponents, as well as to pure misunderstanding. At the outset false opinions are formed of them, and they are falsely labelled. E. Grillparzer, for instance, was dubbed a fatalist tragedy poet during the whole of his long life. These erroneous views are never removed, however hard the misunderstood person might strive. If his works have not given sufficient entertainment, fame does not allow—as in justice it should—the right to have his later achievements examined, although they might correct the first impression. The public is only too ready to believe that the first fame-deserving masterpiece exhausts, in the main, the creator's power of work, and that it is not worth the trouble to listen to what he might afterwards have to say. (Think of Strauss, *e.g.*)

The sole real advantage which fame can,

and should secure for its possessor is denied him, at least in Germany. (In other countries people are more mindful of the duties they owe to their eminent men.) He must drink to the very dregs the cup of vexation arising from unteachable prejudice and deaf misunderstanding. The unjust judgment seldom stops at the work involved, but only too often includes in its grasp the person and his private life. It is equally well known that only a few public persons are spared opponents and enemies who overcloud and embitter a fair condemnation by introducing envious and malevolent considerations. The sensitive man will always find an exhaustless source of illness and worry in this treatment. Even the stolid person who is unaffected by the opinions of others will experience pain and grief at the prevalence of such persistent prejudice and indifference in the world, and at the indestructible existence of vulgar dispositions.

If the famous man is a professional artist whose works give entertainment and satisfaction, his acquaintances trouble themselves to dispose of a number of tickets for his benefit (his share being 50 per cent of the net pro-

ceeds), and they do not miss the opportunity of being present themselves, and applauding vociferously. If he is a writer, whether his writings are interesting or not, they only buy his books if it is the fashion to purchase them, and to give them away as presents. If he does not present his friends with his books, the author must risk being looked upon as disagreeable. They don't trouble themselves about the possibility of their sale being his sole living. It is well known that the most famous of men may suffer hunger if they have not an independent income—and the more likely, the greater the fame. Moreover, true and noble fame is very often only obtained after a long and arduous struggle, and therefore is confined to those who have attained to a ripe age. But what advantage does a man derive from fame after death? Is it not a matter of complete indifference whether the posthumous glory attaches to the name he bore while alive, or to a false one (*e.g.*, Homer), or anonymously, like the Nibelungenliede, to the works themselves? Is it not vanity of vanities to strive after posthumous glory for his own name, from which he himself can gain no benefit? And

even if the famous man becomes very old, and has thoroughly deserved a place on the roll of fame, yet he must share his noble splendour with the falsely shining renown of unworthy competitors; he must therefore receive the holy crowns of fame desecrated by the foreheads of the vulgar. It very often happens that false and true fame are combined, so that a person enjoys false fame for a long time on account of certain side qualities of his work which happen to correspond to the spirit of the age. This soon withers away, and prevents, rather than promotes, the true renown which his works deserve from their more profound contents. The suspicion of such a complication of relations exists where an artist or writer, to whom real fame might not otherwise have been denied, was already famous while young, or during middle age. (Think only of Goethe's "Werther," Schiller's "Robbers," Schelling's "Nature - Philosophy," and similar examples.)

If you, then, dear reader, will not be dissuaded from striving after fame either for yourself or your relatives, at least take this advice: don't seek true, but false fame, for

only the latter assures you the prospect of enjoying its advantages of honor and material gain. But if you reject false fame with scorn, in spite of its ideal and material privileges, merely because it rests on an unsound basis, then cease altogether to labor for renown. Aspire rather to honorable deeds, and care not when, if at all, they are inscribed on the scroll of fame.

MY RELATION TO SCHOPEN- HAUER.

I HAVE frequently explained my relation to Schopenhauer. The fact, however, that these statements are scattered throughout a series of writings has, no doubt, contributed to the confusion prevailing in the public mind in respect to this connection. New books even now appear in which my philosophy is labelled under the head of Schopenhauerism, or the Schopenhauerian School. It will, therefore, not be superfluous for me to give a short summary of the differences between my philosophy and that of Schopenhauer.

Schopenhauer says ("Vierfacher Wurzel," S. 51) that in order to declare one's allegiance to epistemological¹ realism, "one must be forsaken by all the good gods." According to

¹ The adjective corresponding to the theory of knowledge.

him, Kant's cardinal error was to consider the "thing-in-itself" as something affecting the senses, and, therefore, as acting upon us in a causal manner. Schopenhauer sought to arrive at the "thing-in-itself" in a totally different way, namely, from within. I have demonstrated the fallacies involved in this method,¹ and have upheld that of Kant—rejected by Schopenhauer—as being the only one that can lead to the position ultimately resulting in the philosophical realism condemned by Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer accepts only the ideal side of the Kantian epistemology, I, on the other hand, the real. He favors only immanent, I transcendent, causality ("Transcend. Real.," pp. 95-104). Consequently, in respect to theory of knowledge, we are thoroughly opposed to each other.

Since Schopenhauer rightly considers time and space as the sole principle of individuation (*principium individuationis*), from the standpoint of his subjective idealism, all plurality must be strictly confined to the subjective ap-

¹ Cp. my work "Kritische Grundlegung des transscendentalen Realisms," 2nd edition, Berlin, 1875, pp. 46-50.

pearance of the individual perception, whilst the True Being remains unaffected by it. Schopenhauer is, therefore, an Abstract Monist, whilst I am a Concrete Monist. Between the Abstract One-Being and the subjective-ideal phenomena of consciousness, there exists for me the objective-real (transcendental) phenomenal world of many individuals, for which no place can be found in Schopenhauer's Abstract Monism. When, indeed, he introduces into his system the doctrine of an internal development of the one will into several non-temporal acts of will, or intelligible¹ characters of species and individual, or platonic ideas, he does so in utter contradiction of the fundamental proposition of his philosophy, that plurality first becomes possible through space and time. The Schopenhauerian distinction between intelligible and empirical¹ character I reject, as also the doctrine of the transcendental freedom of the former, and the idea of an eternal, *i.e.*, non-temporal act. I deny, moreover, the possibility of conceiving a world of ideas as

¹*Translator's Note.*—The terms empirical and intelligible are used as adjectives corresponding to phenomenon and "thing-in-itself" respectively.

constituting the absolute will, if space and time are to be excluded from the contents of the ideas.

I dispute also that a blind idealess will can develop a world of ideas out of itself, unless we assume the existence of the idea at its side as an equally authenticated principle, and consider both as inseparably entwined functions of one and the same absolute subject. I, therefore, oppose to the Will-Monism or Pantheism of Schopenhauer a Spirit Monism or Panpneumatism; and within my system of Concrete Monism I secure a place for Individualism, of which every theory of the universe must take account, in a manner in which it could not be effected in Schopenhauer's Abstract Monism without contradiction. The logical reason, according to Schopenhauer, springs first together with the intellect from the organism, especially from the brain. It is, therefore, a tertiary, and even an accidental manifestation of the World-being, which in itself is reasonless and illogical. I contend, however, that the reason is the formal principle of the idea which is inseparably united to the will, and as such

regulates and conditions continuously the whole contents of the world-process. Accordingly, in the domain of metaphysics, I find myself at variance with Schopenhauer on the most important matters, and am much more closely allied to those thinkers who, like Eckhart, Böhme, and Schelling, look upon the will as one of the most comprehensive of absolute principles, while they do not, like Schopenhauer, establish it as the sole absolute principle.

Whoever considers time as a merely subjective appearance can find no value in history, and must deprecate as illusionary every belief in development and progress. Schopenhauer's subjective idealism occasioned in this way his unbounded contempt for history, and his utterly unhistorical view of the world. For him history is only the confused and chaotic dream of mankind, in which the fancy turns round itself; an endless and aimless appearance of movement, out of which, of course, nothing can arise. Release from this fiery circle of imaginary wants and pains is possible only for individuals, and not for the whole; because the eternal will to live dreams on its

life in ceaseless duration, undisturbed by the rising and passing away of the individual. I, on the other hand, have adopted a progressive theory of the universe to so considerable an extent that I have frequently been blamed for my "historism." I see redemption only in the providentially guided development of the whole, which the individual, by the selfish salvation of his own person, does not advance, but retards.

With the pure subjectivity of space perception, our conception of Nature loses all its truth. If you deprive Nature of form and movement, all that remains are acts of will indefinable to us, in which we can recognise nothing except the all-comprehensive abstract quality "of being will." Every attempt to mark out real differences would lead to spatial and temporal conditions, and would, therefore, be inadequate,¹ *i.e.*, false. What is, in truth, indivisible unity, the Nature-will, appears to us as plurality. There is only the palest shimmer of plurality, however, in this subjective phenomenon, since it is merely unity divided into

¹*Translator's Note.*—The term used by Spinoza to express the lowest form of idea, the phenomenal.

many parts by the vision. But unity is the harmonical blending of the many, a oneness of relations. All things dovetail into each other independently of the place and time by which they are conditioned, independently, therefore, also of "sooner" and "later." The relation of "later" to "sooner" appears as causality, of "sooner" to "later" as teleology. ("Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," I. 28.) Therefore we understand absolutely nothing concerning Nature, and that part of it which we innocently thought was well within our comprehension—causal mechanism and teleology—has been totally misconceived by us, for it is merely a property of our subjective perception. To this philosophy of Nature mine stands diametrically opposed. It justifies Nature, as science, makes us more and more acquainted with its secrets, as an objective-real, spatial phenomenon, as a manifestation of the World-being, independent of every conscious perception. It recognises, moreover, in the mechanism based on natural laws, the real means for realising the teleology of Nature. With Schopenhauer the intellect, the spirit, exists only "*per accidens*" as a parasite of the

Nature-will. For me Nature is the teleological introduction to and the plinth of the soul ; the Nature-process, the providential instrument for the life-process of the spirit ; and finally the natural as well as the moral world-arrangement are only two sides of the absolute teleological system of the universe.

Schopenhauer's æsthetic idealism is, as I have shown elsewhere, for the most part merely a popular repetition of Schelling's, with this difference : that whilst the metaphysical idealism springs quite naturally from Schelling's absolute subject-object, it is ridiculous to found it on a basis of the Schopenhauerian will-philosophy. The only important deviation from Schelling's idealism is the doctrine of Schopenhauer that music is the direct manifestation of the will without the mediation of the ideas. It is precisely this theory that I consider to be thoroughly discredited. If my æsthetic idealism agreed in all other respects with that of Schopenhauer and Schelling, I should still be more closely allied to the latter. The fact, however, is that my æsthetic idealism, being a concrete system (quite analogous to my metaphysical idealism), differs from their abstract

idealism. The abstract idealism of an eternally immovable, immutable, absolutely transcendent, shadowy world of ideas, as it is understood by Schelling and Schopenhauer, is, indeed, also considered by Hegel—in a metaphysical connection—as an abstract, transcendent idealism. But, in the first place, more stress is laid by Hegel on its “immanence,” and, secondly, the ideal world in its “transcendence” loses its platonic fixity for him in the flux of movement. There is an unmistakable attempt in the Hegelian æsthetics to consider the idea—in its state of flux—as purely immanent.

With this æsthetic idealism of Hegel and his school (Vischer, Rosenkranz, Carriere, Schasler) mine is decidedly more closely connected than with the systems of Schelling and Schopenhauer, both as regards principles, and particularly in reference to the philosophy of art.

The differences in practical philosophy are still more striking than in the theoretical.

Whoever holds that time is purely subjective, and therefore denies all development, must deem it a folly to desire to improve or advance

the world, just as a person looking upon character as unchangeable must consider it a waste of energy to trouble himself with the education of others, or even with ethical selfishness at all. Therefore, according to Schopenhauer, the only course proper for a wise man is a resignation, which lets the world and himself run on as they please, and which in its highest sense—in sympathy with the spirit of the great poets and writers of all times—becomes a refined epicurism. Such an easy-going parasitic life appears to be immoral, since every individual is in duty bound to use his faculties in the service of the whole. Quietism, as natural apathy systematised, is in my opinion a standpoint which is immoral in principle, since it sanctions a thorough-going denial of all positive duties.

Schopenhauer's theory of conduct rests on his monism; it takes its root in the recognition of the unity of being in all individuals in spite of their phenomenal plurality. If a man sees his own nature in that of his kin, he will no longer act wrongly towards him in order to gain an apparent advantage. I have done full justice to the high signification of this monistic

principle of morality,¹ but I have also demonstrated its insufficiency in respect to its isolation. With Schopenhauer this principle does not go beyond negative duties, namely, the avoidance of wrong-doing. The diminution of the suffering of those nearest us, which can only be termed a negative act, belongs to a purely exoteric view of morality, as does the instinctive feeling which lies at the foundation of this monistic principle, sympathy, whose inadequacy and shortcomings I have severely criticised ("Phänom.," pp. 217-48). From the esoteric point of view, according to Schopenhauer, the certain road to redemption for the majority lies in the intensification of suffering; and even if one will not go so far as to recommend the emphasising of pain in others as a profitable and serviceable act for the soul's salvation, at any rate the lessening of pain must be forbidden as a deed destructive of salvation. ("Phänom.," pp. 41-6.)

The esoteric ethics of Schopenhauer applies exclusively to the self-salvation of the individual. It leaves, therefore, to the monistic principle

¹ "Phänom. d. sittlich. Bewusst," pp. 782-97.

of morality nothing but the avoidance of wrong-doing to others. For me, on the one hand, the monistic moral principle is exalted into the religious moral principle (the unity of being with God), and with this into the moral principle of absolute teleology; on the other hand, it first acquires its ethical realisation—wanting in Schopenhauer—in the devotional acts of the individual for the development of the whole.

The esoteric morality of Schopenhauer springs from a combination of metaphysical pessimism with subjective idealism. The former (lacking as it does any teleological system of the world) recommends the suppression of the will to live as the sole moral exercise for the individual; the latter renders the solution of this problem possible to the individual. Quietism alone is not sufficient for the annihilation of the will to live; it must be accompanied by asceticism, at least in the form of voluntary starvation. By means of asceticism, the will is radically suspended from action—that is to say, the “intelligible” character, together with the transcendent being of the individual, is annulled. In my opinion this

ape from life on the part of the individual, and from its positive and ethical exercises, is decidedly immoral. I also consider asceticism to be still more immoral than mere Quietism, quite apart from the fact that, on the basis of subjective idealism, I must discredit the belief that anything more can be obtained through asceticism than by the natural death of the individual, namely, the cessation of a phenomenon by which Being as such is totally unaffected.

Schopenhauer's philosophy of religion rests on an Indian foundation. He recognises Christianity only in so far as it follows Indian models in the monastic asceticism of its Catholic past. Schopenhauer lacks every sense of appreciation of Judaism and Protestantism; Judaism is for him, so to speak, the absolute religion. Religion-philosophy is exhausted, according to him, in the destruction of the individual will by means of Quietism and asceticism; he makes no attempt whatsoever to obtain a religious relationship between mankind and the World-being. My theology, on the other hand, is founded in exactly the same manner as was the Christian, on this religious

connection, and rejects just that part of the Christian philosophy with which Schopenhauer is in sympathy : the escape from the world by means of asceticism. It has, therefore, closer affinity to Protestantism than to Catholicism, and to Christianity than to Judaism. It strives to effect a synthesis between Christian Theism and Indian Abstract Monism, on the basis of Concrete Monism ; and is accordingly most closely allied to that Christian theology which endeavors to interpret Christian theism in a pantheistic sense ; as it is represented, for example, by Eckhart and his school, and, among the Neo-Hegelian Protestants, by Biedermann and Pfleiderer. In the sphere, then, of religion-philosophy, I join issue with Schopenhauer on every positive point of contact. But we have this negative quality in common, that we are the only two speculative philosophers who have openly taken up a position outside Christian theism, and have shown that it is theoretically unsound. Even in respect to this negative link there is an important difference : Schopenhauer simply repudiates the Judæo-Christian theology as false, whilst I look upon it as an indispensable and most significant stage of

the religious development of man, and as an elevating element in his moral and spiritual progress.

I come finally to our pessimism, the most characteristic part of both of our philosophies. It is necessary here to differentiate between empirical and metaphysical pessimism. The former finds a place in many other systems, notably the Christian and the Kantian. The latter, with the sole exception of Hinduism, is represented only by Schopenhauer, by a few of his pupils, and by myself.

Empirical pessimism is not separated from the metaphysical by Schopenhauer, both being derived deductively from two false hypotheses—the blindness and non-rationality of the World-being, and the negativity of pleasure. Moreover, the empirical pessimism of Schopenhauer is not the result of a sober and calm consideration of axiological problems. It is partly deduced from a hyper-sensitive disgust with the world, and partly from a peevishly intolerant indignation with the wickedness of mankind. It is accordingly, in both directions, unscientific and unphilosophical. With this sentimental pessimism of Schopenhauer the

rational empirical pessimism of Kant may be favorably contrasted. The latter combines with this pessimism an optimistic teleology of development, by means of which he rejects the quietistic and ascetic consequences of the Schopenhauerian system. In all these points my empirical pessimism agrees with that of Kant, which has been sadly corrupted by Schopenhauer.¹ I am at one with Kant in assuming that the Hedonistic standard has been laid upon the world for the sole purpose of showing its insufficiency, since it can only give a negative value to the universe. Morality is the only true guide of the world. The ethical value of empirical pessimism is simply to be found in this fact: that it makes it practically easy for mankind to raise itself to the teleological or ethical self-denial which it recommends. No trace is found in Schopenhauer of such an ethical realisation of the empirical, in contradistinction to metaphysical pessimism. On the contrary, he holds that the whole

¹ Cp. my work, "Zur Geschichte und Begründung des Pessimismus" (Berlin, 1881), and No. 1 and under No. 5, "Zur Pessimismus Frage," ch. iv. "In welchem Sinne war Kant ein Pessimist?"


contents of the esoteric morality springs entirely from metaphysical pessimism, whilst I certainly think that neither metaphysical nor empirical pessimism has the slightest influence in the region of ethics, which is exclusively conditioned by teleology.

Metaphysical pessimism is derived deductively by Schopenhauer from the metaphysical axiom of a blind and a logical will. I, on the other hand, have inferred it inductively from empirical pessimism in connection with metaphysical monism. This difference is of the greatest importance. For as soon as we assume the fundamental principle of a deductive system, we must, willy nilly, accept every part of it which has been demonstrated to be the result of a formally correct syllogism. In an inductive system, however, we need only ascend the pyramid as far as we like, and build the next step to our own liking. In a similar manner, one may accept the whole of my system, including the combination of empirical pessimism with teleological optimism, and yet reject its ultimate induction — metaphysical pessimism together with its metaphysical consequences—without altering the foundation and

central portions of the pyramid. If I had only looked for external success in preference to truth, I need have withheld only the comparatively few incriminating passages in my three principal works, and have reserved them for posthumous publication. The gaps would have remained unnoticed. It is always this metaphysical pessimistic crowning point of my system which has led to a condemnation and a refutation of the whole of my philosophy, notwithstanding that this proceeding could only be justified if my system were deductive, and not inductive. This last rung of the inductive ladder, of which the others are so thoroughly independent, is now being utilized as a proof of the identity of my philosophy with that of Schopenhauer. Just as the belief in the possibility of an individual will-suppression corresponds to the subjective phenomenalism of Schopenhauer, so does the belief in the possibility of universal will-annihilation agree with my objective phenomenalism. It is this parallelism of a negative aim—the individual life in the former, the world-process in the latter,—which has actually had the effect of classifying both our systems under the head of

"Nihilism," in the philosophical sense of the term. In this way a most remarkable difference has been overlooked. For with Schopenhauer, metaphysical pessimism and the duty of will-abnegation are the sole moral content of the individual life; whereas for me, metaphysical pessimism and the final extinction of the world-process will be of no practical moment for mankind for centuries to come. It is, therefore, so to speak, a pure speculation. Schopenhauer thinks that man should be occupied daily and hourly in discovering how best to remedy the error of the absolute will in having created him. I, again, exhort man to willingly fulfil the positive teleological obligations to which purpose the absolute will placed him in the world, and not to trouble himself as to the manner in which Providence will conduct the world-process in the dim and distant future. If the optimist revels in anticipation of the golden age of the future, the pessimist may console himself with the hope of a final universal salvation. These nebulous prospects of an indefinite future will certainly be considered by both as a minor motive among the other springs of conduct; whilst, for Schopenhauer,

the entire motivation for the carrying out of asceticism and mortification must be drawn from metaphysical pessimism, and the hope in the immediately imminent will-destruction of the individual. The follower of my system in his practical conduct, as based on this system, cannot be differentiated from the optimist of the ordinary stamp, provided he is a teleologist. The follower of the Schopenhauerian system, however, is a stranger in modern western culture, and can feel at home only on the Ganges.



THE END.